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Credibility in Empirical
Legal Analysis
Hillel J. Bavli†
INTRODUCTION
Empirical analysis is a central component of modern legal
scholarship and litigation. But it is not trusted.1 It is well known
that data can be manipulated to generate any results that a
researcher seeks to find. As Ronald Coase has famously stated, “if
you torture the data enough, nature will always confess.”2 In
scholarship, empirical claims are frequently understood more as a
“cacophony of subjective opinions on the meaning of disparate
findings” than as objective scientific results.3 In the courts, experts
are widely recognized as “hired guns” who will utilize data to arrive
at whatever conclusion most favors the party that provides their
paycheck.4 Indeed, the state of distrust surrounding empirical
analysis in law is well founded.
Empirical analysis is not inherently untrustworthy. But
the way in which it is conducted in law is. The unreliability of
empirical analysis in law cannot be attributed to a single cause. It
is due to a wide range of methodological and institutional factors.
There is, however, a single problem that underlies the lion’s share
of the quality failure in empirical legal analysis: data fishing.5
† Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; Affiliated Faculty,
Harvard Institute for Quantitative Social Science. The author wishes to thank William
Hubbard, Christopher Robertson, Edward Cheng, Pamela Metzger, Andrew Davies, Iavor
Bojinov, Bernard Chao, Donald Rubin, Daniel Heitjan, Barry Goldstein, and Eric Ruben
for their helpful comments, and SMU Dedman School of Law and the WWB Law Professor’s
Fund for their generous financial support.
1 See Kathryn Zeiler, The Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Where Might We
Go from Here, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 78, 78–80 (2016); Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal
Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 169–70 (2004); Lee Epstein & Gary
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6, 15, 54–55 (2002); see also John P.A.
Ioannidis et al., The Power of Bias in Economics Research, 127 ECON. J. F236, F236 (2017).
2 R.H. COASE, HOW SHOULD ECONOMISTS CHOOSE? (1982), reprinted in
RONALD H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 15, 27 (1994).
3 Mitchell, supra note 1, at 176–79.
4 See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174,
184–89 (2010).
5 See infra Part I.
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Data fishing, also known as data dredging or p-hacking, is
a well-recognized problem in the hard and social sciences that
involves using data to search for and selectively (and misleadingly)
report results that are statistically significant or otherwise
favorable to the researcher.6 Data fishing allows a researcher to
manipulate data and the researcher’s analysis to find patterns that
do not in fact exist, or to find particular results that will support
the researcher’s claims, even when the data are not supportive of,
or are contrary to, these claims. Notwithstanding its invalidity, this
practice is extremely prevalent in legal scholarship and litigation—
with damaging consequences.7
It is estimated that, when pharmaceutical giant Merck
allegedly manipulated its data regarding the side effects associated
with its new pain drug Vioxx, this extreme case of data fishing led
to the premature deaths of thousands of Vioxx users.8 In law, data
fishing can similarly destroy lives and cause a range of other
harms. A scholarly article with misleading empirical results can
lead to harmful policies that affect millions of people. Testimony
based on misleading statistical analysis can lead to false
convictions or false acquittals, or incorrect findings of liability or no
liability in major class actions.9 More broadly, data fishing causes
large-scale harm by misleading lawmakers, factfinders, and other
consumers of empirical research.
Data fishing is possible because statistical studies are not
rigid formulaic structures: they require a significant level of
researcher input. Like other forms of research, they demand
thoughtful and logical design based on the particulars of a study.
A researcher, for example, must decide how to define key
variables, how to handle outlying data, what tests to use and
what standards to apply for finding that a test result is
indicative of a significant finding, how to model the data, what
sample size to use, and many other factors. Data fishing allows
researchers to manipulate these discretionary inputs to arrive
at results that are favorable to them.
6 See Joseph P. Simmons et al., False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed
Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant,
22 PSYCH. SCI. 1359, 1359 (2011) (“[I]t is common (and accepted practice) for researchers
to explore various analytical alternatives, to search for a combination that yields
‘statistical significance,’ and to then report only what ‘worked.’”).
7 See infra Sections I.D, I.E.
8 See STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 28–31
(2008); Peter Jüni et al., Risk of Cardiovascular Events and Rofecoxib: Cumulative Metaanalysis, 364 LANCET 2021, 2021–27 (2004); see also Merck Manipulated the Science About
the Drug Vioxx, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/
resources/merck-manipulated-science-about-drug-vioxx [https://perma.cc/J88M-MZKH].
9 See infra Parts I, IV.
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An important factor underlying data fishing is a concept
called motivational bias. Motivational bias is the tendency for a
researcher to favor one result over another due to the interests
of the researcher.10 An organization may sponsor research to
show that its activities are effective; a political group may
sponsor research to support its political agenda; a scholar may
conduct research to obtain a well-placed publication; and a
litigation party may sponsor research to support its argument in
court. Thus, when data fishing is possible, motivational bias can
combine with researcher discretion to yield spurious results and
false claims.11
There are two categories of problems that lead to the
invalidity of statistical studies that rely on data fishing: false
positives and false impressions. Both of these categories of
problems cause the reader to be misled to believe that the
researcher has found significant and replicable results when in
fact the researcher has not.12 These are not minor problems—
they frequently altogether invalidate the researcher’s findings.
As stated in a recent report by the National Academies of the
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM), “when
exploratory research is interpreted as if it were confirmatory
research, there can be no legitimate statistically significant
result.”13 At best, therefore, data fishing promotes distrust of
empirical research and statistical claims; at worst, it propagates
false information and causes poor decision-making, including
the possibility of incorrect verdicts and destructive policy.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that data fishing
necessarily results from purposeful deception or other ill
intention. To the contrary, the data-fishing norm is strong, and
the practice is often committed by well-intentioned researchers
who may be completely unaware of the harms of data fishing or
that their analysis even constitutes data fishing.14 Indeed, a
10 Gilberto Montibeller & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive and Motivational
Biases in Decision and Risk Analysis, 35 RISK ANALYSIS 1230, 1230 (2015) (describing
motivational biases as “conscious or subconscious distortions of judgments and decisions
because of self-interest, social pressures, or organizational context”); see Simmons et al.,
supra note 6, at 1359–60 (noting that “[a] large literature documents that people are selfserving in their interpretation of ambiguous information and remarkably adept at
reaching justifiable conclusions that mesh with their desires,” and suggesting that this
bias causes methodological decisions that lead to statistical significance).
11 See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 180 (highlighting personal, economic, and
political factors that bias empirical research).
12 See infra Section II.C.
13 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., REPRODUCIBILITY AND REPLICABILITY
IN SCIENCE 96 (2019) [hereinafter NASEM REPORT], https://doi.org/10.17226/25303
[https://perma.cc/7R4M-RY2F].
14 Additionally, researchers are often unaware of their own motivational biases
or how such biases may permeate their work. Even if a researcher is fully aware of the
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primary cause of the problem is a lack of awareness and
understanding among researchers. Motivational bias and
researcher discretion are often inherent components of empirical
research. But data fishing need not be. It can be largely
eliminated with attentiveness to the issue and simple
safeguards instituted by readers and researchers.
My aim in this article is to facilitate the elimination of
data fishing in legal scholarship and litigation in two ways.
First, I explain in clear and simple terms what data fishing is,
why it is harmful, and why it should be eliminated in empirical
legal research. Second, I draw on established methods in
statistics and other fields to develop a concrete framework I call
DASS—an acronym for Design, Analyze, Scrutinize, and
Substantiate—for researchers (including empirical scholars and
expert witnesses) to use to safeguard against data fishing, and
for consumers of empirical research (including scholars, courts,
policymakers, and members of the public) to use to evaluate the
reliability of a researcher’s statistical claims.
In summary, DASS requires (1) designing a study—
essentially, contemplating and specifying its methodological
features—prior to analyzing the study’s outcome data; (2) analyzing
the outcome data pursuant to the study’s design; (3) scrutinizing the
study to ensure that it is not misleading to readers with respect to
the robustness of the study’s results; and (4) substantiating these
steps, including by attesting to the researcher’s adherence to DASS
in the study’s report and by establishing evidence of its elements.
Central to DASS is the idea that it is the researcher’s
burden to proactively take steps to safeguard against data fishing
and to persuade readers of these steps in the foreground of the
study’s report together with other aspects of the study’s
methodology. This underlying feature of DASS provides important
advantages over common practices in the natural and social
sciences.15 It creates proper incentives for researchers and ensures
that readers obtain information necessary to properly evaluate a
study’s statistical claims.
DASS thus represents an advancement over current
practices in a number of respects. First, it combines key protections
against data fishing in statistics and packages them in a
harms of data fishing, the researcher, perhaps influenced by the prevalence of the
practice, may nevertheless have good intentions—e.g., to uncover truth or to convince
readers of a point that the researcher believes to be true. Separately, in litigation, data
fishing is often expected and accepted: it is often understood as a natural consequence of
the adversarial system, reflecting the expectation that a litigant will search for and offer
evidence that most favors their position.
15 See infra Part II.
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framework that is substantively and logistically suitable for a
broad range of research contexts, including legal scholarship and
litigation. Second, it improves on common practices in the natural
and social sciences, which themselves are not sufficiently effective.
These practices—which primarily constitute journal requirements
for some form of design “preregistration” or open access to data16—
reflect substantial progress toward credible statistical inference in
a number of nonlegal fields.17 However, they are applied
infrequently and inconsistently, and, even when used, they by and
large constitute a hodgepodge of requirements enforced by
individual journals rather than a coherent standard.18 DASS
overlaps with these practices in various respects (most
prominently, regarding the value it places on methodological
prespecification), but it is distinct: it is a concrete framework for
safeguarding against data fishing that is intended for use by both
researchers and readers, and at its center is the idea that it is the
researcher’s responsibility not only to be proactive in safeguarding
against data fishing but also to evidence her safeguards directly to
readers and thereby signal credibility to them directly. Arguably,
this is particularly important in legal scholarship, which generally
does not involve a peer-review selection process for publications.19
In Part I of this article, I explain the problem of data fishing
in clear and simple terms. I demonstrate the problem with
straightforward examples and show why data fishing causes false
positives and false impressions, and why it altogether invalidates
statistical studies that rely on it. I then discuss implications of data
fishing for legal scholarship and expert evidence in litigation.
In Part II, I explain the elements of DASS, including what
they entail and how they safeguard against data fishing and negate
16 See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. Other practices, such as
requiring general ethics statements and robustness checks, also exist in some contexts.
17 See generally Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, The Credibility
Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out
of Econometrics, J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring 2010, at 3 (arguing that a focus on research
design has been central to increased credibility in empirical economics); Daniel E. Ho &
Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 17 (2011) (discussing advances in causal inference in empirical legal studies
and emphasizing the importance of good research design).
18 See infra Section I.D.
19 Natural-science and social-science journals, unlike the vast majority of scholarly
journals in law, generally involve a peer-review selection process for the publication of articles.
See, e.g., Publication Process, NEW ENG. J. MED., https://www.nejm.org/media-center/
publication-process [https://perma.cc/SE2X-DNPF] (summarizing peer-review process for
medical journal); Journal Policies, Q.J. ECON., https://academic.oup.com/qje/pages/policies
[https://perma.cc/3YVU-DGK4] (summarizing peer-review process for economics journal).
This difference highlights a significant vulnerability for empirical legal scholarship with
respect to the risk of data fishing. Pressure on authors to present research at conferences and
workshops may help, but not necessarily. In any event, it is far from sufficient.
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its harmful consequences. Additionally, I discuss practical
considerations regarding implementation and explain how certain
details of the framework flex to accommodate a wide variety of
research settings and conditions.
In Part III, I examine a significant concern: the importance
of using data exploration to inform study design. Specifically, while
DASS requires safeguarding against data fishing by designing a
study prior to analyzing its data, a study’s design will often benefit
immensely from the use of exploratory analysis to develop and
refine the study’s methodology. To address this issue, I again draw
on methods in statistics and other fields—in particular, pilot
studies and a procedure called “cross validation”—to explain a
simple approach, consistent with DASS, for fulfilling the
researcher’s need for exploratory analysis without compromising
the validity of the study. This approach, which involves
partitioning a dataset into data for exploration and data for testing
(or, in the experimental context, obtaining pilot data for
exploration prior to beginning the main study), can be used in
conjunction with DASS to allow for such exploration while still
safeguarding against data fishing and its harmful effects.
In Part IV, I examine in greater detail the implications of
data fishing for litigation, and for expert evidence in particular. I
argue that data fishing plays a substantial role in the “hired-gun”
and battle-of-the-experts problems in evidence law. I explain that,
in cases in which expert evidence involves empirical analysis, data
fishing allows an expert to search for and use a methodology that
is most favorable to the sponsoring litigant’s position.
Consequently, the mere opportunity for data fishing may give rise
to a prisoner’s dilemma situation in which opposing experts engage
in data fishing and ultimately a disingenuous battle over
methodology, and in which the jury trusts neither expert and often
selects a winner based on criteria other than the merits of the
experts’ arguments. This situation harms accuracy and degrades
the public’s faith in the courts. I show, however, how courts can
apply the DASS framework to address this problem by preventing
data fishing.
Finally, I conclude by highlighting the importance of
DASS’s substantiation element and considering concretely, in light
of this article’s analysis, what it means for a researcher to attest to
her adherence to DASS.
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DATA FISHING: THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IN EMPIRICAL
LEGAL RESEARCH

In recent years, there has been enormous growth in
empirical legal studies, and empirical research now pervades
many areas of legal scholarship and litigation.20 At the same
time, confidence in empirical legal research is low.21 Worse, this
distrust is justified. In this Part, I explain the central role of
data fishing in the trust crisis in empirical legal research. I
begin by describing a number of preliminary statistical
concepts and by demonstrating the problem using a dataset
and a recent study. I then explain concretely why data fishing
leads to results that are statistically and substantively invalid.
Finally, I discuss the prevalence of data fishing in empirical
research in legal scholarship and litigation.
A.

Statistical Inference: Preliminary Concepts

Statistical inference involves learning about a group of
objects—a population—by examining a subgroup of that
population—a sample.22 For example, if I want to learn the
average age of students in my one-hundred-student class, I may
randomly select 10 students and use the average age of the 10
students to better understand the average age of the entire class
of students. The entire class of students constitutes the
population, and the random selection of 10 students constitutes
the sample. I can define an estimand—the thing I want to
estimate—as the mean of the ages of all students in my class,
the population mean. I can define an estimator—the thing I will
use to estimate the estimand—as the mean of the ages of all

20 See Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in Law,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1195–1202 (2013) (discussing the “enormous shift in interest” and work
in empirical legal studies); Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical
Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1713 (2011) (discussing
growth of empirical legal studies); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the
Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873,
874–76 (2008) (commenting on growth of empirical legal research); Tracey E. George, An
Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 142
(2006) (highlighting “dramatic[ ] . . . expan[sion]” of empirical legal studies “in law reviews, at
conferences, and among leading law faculties” (footnotes omitted)); see also Zeiler, supra note 1,
at 78–80 (discussing importance of empirical scholarship).
21 See supra note 1.
22 See generally MORRIS H. DEGROOT & MARK J. SCHERVISH, PROBABILITY AND
STATISTICS 376–94 (Pearson Educ. 4th ed. 2012) (explaining statistical concepts related to
estimation); DAVID COPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 27–31 (2005) (explaining
statistical concepts related to sampling); GEORGE CASELLA & ROGER L. BERGER, STATISTICAL
INFERENCE 311–72 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining statistical concepts related to estimation).
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students in my sample. Once I have computed this sample
mean, it will serve as my estimate of the population mean.23
In this context, hypothesis testing is a procedure for
examining whether a claim regarding a population is supported
by the evidence, the sample data.24 Assume, for example, that, in
the context of an argument regarding trends away from
traditional routes to law school, I want to evaluate the claim that
the average age of law students in my course is different from 24.
I could construct a hypothesis test that tests the null hypothesis
that the mean age of students in my course is 24. I test this
against an alternative hypothesis that the mean age of students
in my course is different from 24. Assume that my sample mean
is 25.5. Is this difference from 24 sufficient to reject the null
hypothesis that the average age of students in my course (rather
than just in my sample) is 24? To decide this, I could define a level
of statistical significance, which, here, represents the difference
between the sample mean and the hypothesized population mean
that would provide good evidence that the population mean is not
as hypothesized.25
Similarly, we could use hypothesis testing to test the
claim that the average age of men in my course differs from the
average age of women in my course. We could take a random
sample of 10 men and 10 women and compare the difference in
means in the two groups to the null hypothesis of “zero
difference” to determine whether there is a statistically
significant difference as to justify the conclusion that the
average age of men and average age of women in my course
differ. A difference of one or two years may be insignificant if the
ages of students in the course vary substantially—in which case,
the difference may simply reflect randomness associated with
the samples. Or, the difference may be significant if there is little
variability in the ages of students in the course.
Commonly, researchers use a level of significance of 0.05,
or 5%.26 This means that the researcher would reject the null
hypothesis if the observed difference (e.g., from the hypothesized
mean in the first example above, or between the male and female
groups in the second example above) is sufficiently large such
23 See generally COPE, supra note 22, at 28–31, 48–55 (explaining statistical
concepts related to estimation).
24 See id. at 36–41; DEGROOT & SCHERVISH, supra note 22, at 530–623.
25 See COPE, supra note 22, at 40 (“A statistically significant difference between
a population mean and the mean of a random sample is a difference large enough to
justify the claim that the sample was taken from a population with a mean different
from the mean of the given population.”).
26 Id.
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that we would observe a difference of such size due to
randomness (from sampling) only 5% of the time, assuming that
the null hypothesis (e.g., the mean age equaling 24 in the first
example, or the mean difference between men and women
equaling zero in the second example) is true.27
A p-value is defined as the probability of observing a
value at least as extreme as the observed value, assuming the
truth of the null hypothesis.28 Thus, the researcher compares the
p-value to the level of significance to determine whether to reject
the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis.29
Finally, a type I error is defined as rejecting the null
hypothesis when it is in fact true, and a type II error is defined
as not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact not true.30
B.

What Is Data Fishing?

Data fishing is the practice of searching numerous
research methodologies—including different models, design
components, analytical methods, and hypotheses—and
selectively reporting only those that produce significant or
otherwise favorable results.31 As suggested in the Introduction,
a researcher will generally encounter numerous choices in
conducting a study aimed at answering a particular research
question.32 These choices may relate to, e.g., whether to include
a particular variable in a regression model, how to define a
causal effect, how to estimate a causal effect, what sampling
methods to use, how to categorize the data, what testing
procedures to use, what level of significance to set, how to handle
outliers, how to group the data, what multiple-comparisons
adjustment to use, and many other aspects of a study’s
Id.
See PAUL R. ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATION & EXPERIMENT: AN INTRODUCTION
TO CAUSAL INFERENCE 40–43, 350 (2017).
29 See DEGROOT & SCHERVISH, supra note 22, at 539 (“In general, the p-value
is the smallest level [of significance] 𝛼 such that we would reject the null-hypothesis at
level 𝛼 with the observed data.”); see also ROSENBAUM, supra note 28, at 43; CASELLA &
BERGER, supra note 22, at 397.
30 See COPE, supra note 22, at 41–42.
31 See Megan L. Head et al., The Extent and Consequences of P-Hacking in
Science, PLOS BIOLOGY 1 (Mar. 2015), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002106
[https://perma.cc/T7CR-6KBB] (“Inflation bias, also known as ‘p-hacking’ or ‘selective
reporting,’ . . . . occurs when researchers try out several statistical analyses and/or data
eligibility specifications and then selectively report those that produce significant results.”).
32 Simmons et al. refer to these options as researcher degrees of freedom. See
Simmons et al., supra note 6, at 1359 (“In the course of collecting and analyzing data,
researchers have many decisions to make: Should more data be collected? Should some
observations be excluded? Which conditions should be combined and which ones
compared? Which control variables should be considered? Should specific measures be
combined or transformed or both?”).
27
28
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methodology. Many of these methodological choices involve
multiple reasonable options; therefore, there are countless
combinations of reasonable options.
Assume, then, that there are C1 . . . Cn reasonable
methodological combinations from which a researcher can
choose. Numerous combinations, C1 . . . Cm, can be expected to
generate significant results. Many of these, however, C1 . . . Cf,
may be false positives. A researcher engaged in data fishing
(knowingly or naively) may search for the combinations,
C1 . . . Cm, that produce significant results and selectively report
them in isolation of the many tests that produce nonsignificant
results. By doing so, the researcher misrepresents the results as
being reliable with respect to some stated standard when in fact
they are not.33
To illustrate, assume that a researcher wishes to show
that a certain factor, “Factor X,” reduces prison sentences for a
particular category of serious felonies. She uses a dataset that
contains prison-sentence data from two groups, one in which
Factor X exists, and one in which it does not. The data is
summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Table 1. Summary statistics for simulated prison-sentence data.
Group
Factor
No Factor

Sample
Size
100
100

Minimum
2
8

1st
Quartile
17
20

Median Mean
21
24

24
24

3rd
Quartile
25
29

Maximum
82
42

33 Note that a researcher may engage in data fishing without explicitly testing
multiple combinations. The researcher does not need to conduct multiple tests explicitly to use
the outcome data to develop her methodology. Indeed, “given a particular data set, it is not so
difficult to look at the data and construct completely reasonable rules for data exclusion, coding,
and data analysis that can lead to statistical significance—thus, the researcher needs only
perform one test, but that test is conditional on the data.” Andrew Gelman & Eric Loken, The
Garden of Forking Paths: Why Multiple Comparisons Can Be a Problem, Even When There Is
No “Fishing Expedition” or “P-Hacking” and the Research Hypothesis Was Posited Ahead of
Time 3 (Nov. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman
/research/unpublished/p_hacking.pdf [https://perma.cc/YER7-ZJS7].
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Figure 1. Overlapping histograms for simulated prison-sentence data.

Let us consider how the researcher might use data fishing to
demonstrate to a reader that Factor X causes a reduction in prison
sentences. First, she may perform a hypothesis test to determine
whether the mean of the group with Factor X is significantly less
than the mean of the group without Factor X (the “control” group).
Performing a standard test called a t-test34 on the data depicted in
Figure 1 results in a p-value of 0.965, which indicates no
statistically significant difference under any standard level of
significance. Disappointed, the researcher eyeballs the data and
determines that the difference between the group means would be
substantially wider if the few data points near the rightmost part of
the histogram are not included in the analysis. The researcher,
therefore, decides that these data points should be considered
“outlier” sentences that should appropriately be “winsorized”—that
is, reduced for purposes of the data analysis to be closer to the main
body of the Factor X data.35 In particular, the researcher winsorizes
the data at the 97th percentile, thus reducing all data points above
the 97th percentile down to the 97th percentile.
It is important to note that winsorization is not in and of
itself an improper method. In fact, it is a standard method for
accounting for outliers—outliers that may otherwise give rise to
spurious results.36 The problem, however, is that the researcher

34 DEGROOT & SCHERVISH, supra note 22, at 576–85; COPE, supra note 22, at
36–41, 89–90.
35 Winsorization is a statistical technique used to address outliers. See John W.
Tukey, The Future of Data Analysis, 33 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 1, 17–19 (1962).
36 See, e.g., infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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winsorizes for the purpose of achieving a significant result, not
necessarily because it is appropriate for the circumstances at hand.
Once the data is winsorized, the researcher then
performs a new hypothesis test comparing the means of the
winsorized data. Performing a t-test on the same data, except
now after winsorization, results in a p-value of 0.43. This p-value
again indicates no statistically significant difference under any
standard level of significance (e.g., 0.05, or even 0.1).
Frustrated, the researcher decides to winsorize further—
first at the 95th percentile and then at the 90th percentile—and to
rerun her hypothesis test. Using these winsorization schemes, she
obtains p-values of 0.0419 and 0.0005, respectively. Both of these
p-values are less than 0.05, indicating statistical significance at the
0.05 level. But, after realizing that 0.0419 will fall short of
significance once she adjusts the p-value to account for disclosed
multiple comparisons (a standard adjustment to prevent false
positives associated with multiple tests), she chooses between (a)
using a 0.1 level of significance (which is somewhat less standard
than a 0.05 level) and winsorizing at the 95th percentile or (b)
maintaining a 0.05 level of significance and winsorizing at the 90th
percentile. She decides based on which option seems more
plausible methodologically. For example, she may decide on the
latter option, arguing that data falling above the 90th percentile
constitute outliers. Or, she may choose the former option and argue
that a 0.1 level of significance is appropriate. Either way, her
argument for what is appropriate is heavily influenced by her
interest in achieving a significant result.
Note that, in this example, I have focused on only two
methodological factors—winsorization and levels of significance. In
reality, however, the researcher may experiment with a very broad
range of methodological factors. As in the example above—but on
a far more extreme scale—she can then select one of the perhaps
few methodological combinations that yield a significant result,
present it in isolation of the other methodological combinations,
and use it to support her claim—for example, that Factor X reduces
prison sentences.
Let us consider a recent experiment in which a coauthor and
I sought to test, among other things, the effect of certain evidence on
the magnitude of awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages.37 In designing the experiment, we considered various ways
to define magnitude. For example, we could use the mean, the
37 Hillel J. Bavli & Reagan Mozer, The Effects of Comparable-Case Guidance
on Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages: Evidence from a Randomized
Controlled Trial, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405 (2019) [hereinafter The Effects of CCG].

2022]

CREDIBILITY IN EMPIRICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS

513

median, or the mean of the log-transformed data (“log mean”). As
demonstrated in Table 2, which is an excerpt from a table in The
Effects of Comparable-Case Guidance on Awards for Pain and
Suffering and Punitive Damages (The Effects of CCG) (although
modified for clarity), the effect of the evidence on magnitude is highly
sensitive to the way in which magnitude is defined.
Table 2. Effect of certain evidence on magnitude under
alternative definitions.38

Log
mean
Treatment
vs.
Control

+

Punitive Damages
Mean
Median Mean
(winsor
90th)
0

–

0

Log
mean
+

Pain and Suffering
Mean
Median Mean (winsor
90th)
0

0

+

For example, comparing treatment (here, exposure to
certain evidence) to control (no exposure to the evidence) while
defining the magnitude of punitive damages awards using the
mean and winsorizing at the 95th percentile (the default in that
experiment) yields a negative effect of the treatment, whereas
using the median yields no effect. Further, using the mean and
winsorizing at the 90th percentile (rather than the 95th
percentile) also yields no effect, whereas using the log mean (a
standard measure for dollar values) and winsorizing at the 95th
percentile yields a positive effect. Finally, comparing treatment
to control using the pain and suffering data yields no negative
effect for any of the associated combinations.39
It is important to realize that each of these combinations
may be reasonable. A researcher can likely justify using any of
them. Thus, it would be easy for a researcher to engage in data
Id. at 445.
A common method of data fishing involves experimenting with different
possible ways of dividing a dataset and conducting numerous comparisons among the
resulting subgroups. As Andrew Gelman and Eric Loken explain using an example
involving research regarding response differences between Democrats and Republicans for
purposes of proving the importance of context for understanding mathematical concepts,
38
39

there is a huge number of possible comparisons that can be performed—all
consistent with the data. For example, the pattern could be found (with
statistical significance) among men and not among women—explicable under
the theory that men are more ideological than women. Or the pattern could be
found among women but not among men—explicable under the theory that
women are more sensitive to context, compared to men. Or the pattern could
be statistically significant for neither group, but the difference could be
significant (still fitting the theory . . . ). Or the effect might only appear among
men who are being asked the questions by female interviewers.
Gelman & Loken, supra note 33, at 3.
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fishing—that is, to test each combination to determine which of
them provides the most favorable results, and then to use that
combination and selectively report the favorable results in
isolation of the others.
In The Effects of CCG, we presented the information in
Table 2 to explain and demonstrate the sensitivity of the results
to the measure used to define magnitude, and we concluded that
the effect at issue “is a question for future research.”40 If, however,
a researcher sought to use this data to support a claim that the
evidence reduces magnitude, increases magnitude, or has no
effect on magnitude, data fishing would allow the researcher to
cherry-pick the measure of magnitude that supports the claim
and present that measure, and its accompanying result, in
isolation of the other measures and associated results. For the
reasons explained in the following Section, this practice would
lead to incorrect results and false claims.
C.

Why Data Fishing Produces Invalid Results

Why data fishing produces invalid results is not obvious.
After all, if an explorer believes that a treasure exists in a sunken
ship in a certain area of the ocean, and he funds an expedition to
search for and recover it, his exploration would not invalidate the
find. So why should similar exploration in a dataset invalidate a
statistical find? The operative distinction between treasure
hunting and data fishing is that data fishing produces results—
and ultimately misleading results—by exploiting randomness
due to sampling.
Data fishing gives rise to a number of concerns. In this
article, I focus on two major concerns in particular. First and
foremost, data fishing causes false positives—that is, false findings
that something is true when in fact it is not. As I explain below, this
occurs because data fishing involves undisclosed “multiple
comparisons” and “overfitting.” Second, and also important, data
fishing causes false impressions—specifically, incorrect perceptions
that a researcher’s results are more robust and replicable than they
in fact are. Let us examine each of these concerns.
1. False Positives
Data fishing causes false positives due to undisclosed and
unaddressed “multiple comparisons” and due to “overfitting.”

40

The Effects of CCG, supra note 37, at 455.
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When a researcher chooses a 0.05 level of significance, she
is accepting a degree of error. At this level of significance, the
researcher rejects the null hypothesis if there is sufficient evidence
that only 5% of the time, she will reject the null hypothesis when it
is in fact true. This means that, at this level of significance, one out
of twenty hypothesis tests (involving a true null hypothesis) will
result in a false positive, where the pattern detected is due to
sampling randomness rather than a true characteristic of the
population. At significance levels of 0.01 or 0.1, one out of one
hundred or one out of ten hypothesis tests (involving a true null
hypothesis) will result in a false positive, respectively. Thus, as a
researcher performs more hypothesis tests, the likelihood of
obtaining a false positive increases. This problem is known as the
multiple-comparisons problem.
As a consequence of the multiple-comparisons problem,
data fishing increases a study’s rate of false positives. This is
because data fishing involves searching the data for a methodology
that will yield favorable results. If a researcher applies, for
example, a 0.05 level of significance but engages in data fishing by
searching for and selectively reporting significant results, then the
researcher will have a false-positive rate higher, and often
substantially higher, than 0.05. For instance, if a researcher
performs twenty hypothesis tests at a 0.05 level of significance, the
likelihood of at least one false positive is approximately 64%.41
Similarly, if she conducts one hundred hypothesis tests, and in
these tests the null hypotheses are in fact true, then, on average,
the researcher will obtain five significant results based on chance
alone. If the researcher is simply cherry-picking significant results
and reporting them as significant with a 0.05 level of significance,
it is possible that all or most of these results are false positives. In
any event, the researcher is reporting a likelihood of type I error of
0.05 when, in fact, it is substantially higher. Similarly, if the
researcher is seeking a particular result and tests numerous
methodologies until one “works,” this result has a high likelihood
of being a false positive.
There are well-established methods in statistics for
addressing the multiple-comparisons problem. These methods
adjust a hypothesis test to account for the increased risk of false
positives associated with multiple comparisons. However, data
fishing generally involves undisclosed exploration for significant
results, and therefore undisclosed multiple comparisons.42 As such,
it is rare that that a researcher will address this problem by
41
42

STEPHEN B. HULLEY ET AL., DESIGNING CLINICAL RESEARCH 59 (3d ed. 2007).
See supra Section I.B.
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applying a multiple-comparisons adjustment. Consequently, the
rate of false positives is likely to be far higher than that reported.
Thus, data fishing involves multiple comparisons and consequently
a high rate of false-positive results.
A closely related way in which data fishing causes false
positives is due to a problem known as “overfitting.” In general,
overfitting occurs when a statistical model incorrectly interprets
randomness due to sampling as a pattern or true characteristic
of the population of interest.43 Overfitting is a problem because
our standard goal in statistical modeling is to develop a model that can
capably generalize to new observations similar, but not identical, to the
ones we have sampled. We generally do not care very much about how
well we can predict scores for the observations in our existing sample,
since we already know what those scores are. In this sense, the prediction
error that we compute when we fit a model on a particular dataset is only
a proxy for the quantity we truly care about, which is the error term that
we would obtain if we were to apply our . . . model to an entirely new set
of observations sampled from the same population.44

When a researcher explores data and attempts to find
patterns by examining different combinations of methodological
features, she essentially makes assumptions about the data, or
places constraints on it. In essence, she develops a model to explain
it. This occurs both with data fishing and with innocent exploration.
For example, when the researcher decides to omit certain outliers,
she makes assumptions regarding the role that the outliers play in
the data. Implicitly, she has a theory for why the outliers can be
omitted when performing her analysis. This model, in a sense,
constrains the data. The more constraints the researcher puts on the
data, the better she will be able to explain the patterns in the data
through her model, up to the point that her model is so complex that
it simply explains individually each point of the data. Such a model
is useless for inference, however, because it is not generalizable to
other datasets—it is so constrained, so complex, that it can only
explain that particular dataset. This is the idea of overfitting.
Figure 2 illustrates this concept in the regression context by
comparing an appropriate linear regression model for the data (the
straight line) to an overfit model (the curved line). The overfit model
perfectly fits the data in this sample; but applying it to a new sample
from the same population would lead to a high level of error relative
to the straight line. It is too specific to this dataset: it interprets
43 See Tal Yarkoni & Jacob Westfall, Choosing Prediction Over Explanation in
Psychology: Lessons from Machine Learning, 12 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 1100, 1102
(2017) (“The tendency for statistical models to mistakenly fit sample-specific noise as if
it were signal is commonly referred to as overfitting.”).
44 Id.
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randomness (from sampling) as characteristics of the population and
incorporates this randomness into the model as true effects. But a
second sample would involve different data points (due to sampling
variation) and this model would be inappropriate as applied to the
new data.
Figure 2. Comparison between an appropriate model (straight
line) for the data and an overfit model (curved line).

Data fishing can therefore lead to, or can be described as a
form of, overfitting.45 In this context, overfitting (a concept
borrowed from the machine-learning literature) means that the
researcher imposes too many specifications on a hypothesis test
and mistakenly interprets a significant result as a true pattern
associated with the population when it is in fact just due to
randomness associated with the particular sample examined.
When a researcher searches for a combination of
methodological features that will generate a significant result, she
effectively builds a study’s methodology to fit the sample data (in
the sense of finding patterns in the specific sample of data
examined). This causes a high likelihood that the detected pattern
(indicated by statistical significance) is specific to the sample data
rather than a true signal—that is, rather than a characteristic of
the population. In other words, the study’s methodology is likely to
detect noise due to sampling rather than a pattern that is
replicable in other samples.46
As Yarkoni and Westfall put it, “p-hacking can be usefully
conceptualized as a special case of overfitting. Specifically, it can be
45
46

See id. at 1104.
See id. at 1102–04.
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thought of as a form of procedural overfitting that takes place prior
to (or in parallel with) model estimation—for example, during
data cleaning, model selection, or choosing which analyses to
report.”47 They explain:
Every pattern that could be observed in a given dataset reflects some
(generally unknown) combination of signal and error. The more flexible
a statistical model or human investigator is willing to be—that is, the
wider the range of patterns they are willing to “see” in the data—the
greater the risk of hallucinating a pattern that is not there at all. . . . [A]
procedurally overfitted or p-hacked analysis will often tell an
interesting story that appears to fit the data exceptionally well in an
initial sample but cannot be corroborated in future samples. . . . [T]he
culprit is unrestrained flexibility—in this case, in the data analysis and
interpretation of results . . . .48

In summary, data fishing leads to major problems involving
undisclosed multiple comparisons and overfitting, and thereby
causes false-positive results. Indeed, even a low level of flexibility
in selecting combinations of methodological factors based on
outcome data can produce false positives at a rate that is
unacceptable and altogether invalidates a study’s results. In a 2011
study, for example, Simmons et al. showed that even just a few
methodological options (in Yarkoni and Westfall’s words, just “a
moderate amount of flexibility in analysis choice”49) “would lead to
a stunning 61% false-positive rate!”50 They emphasize that, with
just “four common researcher degrees of freedom,” “[a] researcher
is more likely than not to falsely detect a significant effect.”51
Furthermore, the authors explain that, “[a]s high as these
estimates are, they may actually be conservative.”52 After all, the
authors “did not consider many other degrees of freedom that
researchers commonly use.”53 These include:
testing and choosing among more than two dependent variables (and the
various ways to combine them), testing and choosing among more than
one covariate (and the various ways to combine them), excluding subsets
of participants or trials, flexibility in deciding whether early data were
part of a pilot study or part of the experiment proper, and so on.54

47 Id. at 1104. Although I draw on this idea of “procedural overfitting,” for
simplicity, throughout the current article, I use the more general term “overfitting.” Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1103–04.
50 Simmons et al., supra note 6, at 1361.
51 Id. (using the following points of flexibility: “flexibility in analyzing two
dependent variables”; flexibility in “collect[ing] 10 additional observations per condition”;
“flexibility in controlling for gender or for an interaction between gender and the independent
variable”; and flexibility in “dropping (or not dropping) one of three conditions”).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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Other studies have found similar results.55
2. False Impressions
In addition to causing false-positive results, data fishing
misleads readers to attach more importance to the findings than
they deserve. In particular, even if a result is not a false positive—
i.e., it is in fact a characteristic of the population—it may lack
robustness even to minor changes in methodology.
Distinguish between two concepts: replicability across
different samples of data and replicability across different
reasonable methodologies. The former concept, which, for purposes
of this article, I call sample replicability, refers to the consistency
of results when a researcher applies the same methodology as in
an initial study but on a new sample of data. If a result is a false
positive, it is a feature of the sample examined but is not sample
replicable. The latter concept, which, for purposes of this article, I
call method replicability, refers to the consistency of results when
a new researcher applies a similar but not identical methodology
as in the initial study using the same or a new sample of data.56
Sample replicability relates to the robustness of the results to
different samples while method replicability relates to the
robustness of the results to different methodologies.57 Both types of
55 See Yarkoni & Westfall, supra note 43, at 1104 (citing Michael J. Strube,
SNOOP: A Program for Demonstrating Consequences of Premature and Repeated Null
Hypothesis Testing, 38 BEHAV. RSCH. METHODS 24 (2006)).
56 My use of the language “similar but not identical” is intended to be consistent
with the NASEM Report’s use of the language “sufficiently similar conditions” in its
description of assessing replicability. See NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 73 (citing
Florian Cova et al., Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy, 12 REV.
PHIL. & PSYCH. 9 (2018), in relation to the meaning of “sufficiently similar”).
57 There has been considerable confusion, controversy, and inconsistency
surrounding the terms repeatability, replicability, and reproducibility. See NASEM REPORT,
supra note 13, at 42–44 (describing inconsistency and confusion regarding the terms
reproducibility and replicability); Hans E. Plesser, Reproducibility vs. Replicability: A Brief
History of a Confused Terminology, 11 FRONTIERS NEUROINFORMATICS 1, 1–3 (2018). NASEM
addresses this confusion and inconsistency in the NASEM Report, which was funded by the
National Science Foundation and sponsored by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. The NASEM
Report adopts the following terminology: “Reproducibility means obtaining consistent
computational results using the same input data, computational steps, methods, code, and
conditions of analysis. Replicability means obtaining consistent results across studies aimed
at answering the same scientific question, each of which has obtained its own data.” News
Release, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, & Medicine, New Report Examines
Reproducibility and Replicability in Science, Recommends Ways to Improve Transparency
and Rigor in Research (Apr. 7, 2019), https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2019/05/newreport-examines-reproducibility-and-replicability-in-sciencerecommends-ways-to-improve-transparency-and-rigor-in-research [https://perma.cc/LE
M6-PGJX]; see also NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.
The concepts defined in the text of the current article—sample replicability and
method replicability—are specific types of replicability within the definition of that concept
adopted by the NASEM Report. See NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 85 (“In some cases,
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replicability are fundamental to a good study. As emphasized above
in the discussion of false positives, results that are not sample
replicable are not useful. In this discussion of false impressions, our
focus is on method replicability: the importance of a statistical
result relies on a reasonable degree of robustness to alternative
methodologies, and data fishing misleads the reader to believe that
a result is more robust than it actually is.
Consider again the results in Table 2. Assume that a
researcher wishes to prove that applying some intervention, or
“treatment,” causes a reduction in damages. The researcher has
discretion over a number of design options: she may focus on
awards for pain and suffering or punitive damages; she may
measure central tendency using the log mean, median, or mean;
and she may winsorize at the 90th percentile or the 95th
percentile (the default in that study). In actuality, the researcher
would have discretion over numerous other factors and would
have more options for each factor. For simplicity, however,
assume that these are the researcher’s only points of flexibility.
Assume also that the researcher engages in data fishing. She
performs hypothesis tests for each combination of these
possibilities and draws up, in her private notes, the table
presented in Table 2. She then identifies the one combination—
punitive damages, mean, and winsorization at the 95th
percentile—that achieves her sought-after result, a significant
negative effect. Finally, she reports this effect to readers in
isolation of the other tests and uses it to support her claim that
this treatment causes a reduction in damages.
Because this result is the product of data fishing, it has a
relatively high likelihood of being a false positive. Let us assume,
however, that it is not a false positive—given the methodology, it
is a true characteristic of the population of interest. If this exact
methodology (using the mean, winsorizing at the 95th percentile,
and using the punitive damages data) is performed using a new
sample, the researcher is likely to obtain the same result.
On the other hand, regardless of whether the result is a
false positive, it is misleading in that it is extremely sensitive to
non-replicability arises from the inherent characteristics of the systems under study. In
others, decisions made by a researcher or researchers in study execution that reasonably
differ from the original study such as judgment calls on data cleaning or selection of
parameter values within a model may also result in non-replication. Other sources of nonreplicability arise from conscious or unconscious bias in reporting, mistakes and errors
(including misuse of statistical methods), and problems in study design, execution, or
interpretation in either the original study or the replication attempt.”). By using these terms,
I do not mean to add to the plethora of terms in the statistics literature or to the confusion
surrounding the concepts of reproducibility and replicability. My intention is only to clarify
an important conceptual distinction relevant to this article’s discussion.
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changes in methodology. It is not method replicable. In
particular, the reader interprets the result as more robust than
it is, because she justifiably assumes that the researcher
designed the study neutrally based on what was most
appropriate for the study and not based on a search for which
methodology yields a result that most favors the researcher’s
claim. The reader is not aware, and understandably does not
assume, that the researcher selected, post hoc and for the
purpose of supporting her claim, the one methodological
combination (out of eight) that yields a favorable result. The
reader’s assumptions are justified by the fact that, as shown in
Section I.B, a researcher can usually arrive at whatever result
she seeks if she can cherry-pick a methodology based on which
one yields the most favorable result. In other words, the reader’s
assumptions are justified by the implicit representation that the
study is confirmatory rather than exploratory.
One way of understanding the reader’s assumptions and
the ensuing problem is as follows: When a researcher states that
she arrived at a significant result winsorizing at the 95th
percentile and measuring central tendency using the mean—not
an unreasonable combination in and of itself—the reader
reasonably assumes some degree of robustness to design
modification (e.g., measuring central tendency using the median
instead of the mean). This assumption arises from the
reasonable expectation that the researcher made these choices
neutrally, based on her interest in using an appropriate design
rather than an interest in achieving a specific result. The
researcher’s use of data fishing in a sense exploits this
assumption and misleads the reader to overvalue the
researcher’s results.
Again, a researcher may engage in data fishing for a wide
variety of reasons. Although it is easy to imagine a villainous
researcher, motivated by greed or self-advancement, sitting at a
desk and aggressively testing methodology after methodology to
find and selectively report significant results (or better,
programming a computer to test all such methodologies), it is
likely that most data fishing occurs without the researcher’s
knowledge or understanding of the practice or its effects, or
otherwise without ill intention. In any event, by causing false
positives and false impressions, data fishing can be very harmful.
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D.

The Prevalence of Data Fishing in Empirical Legal
Scholarship

There is a dearth of formal empirical research regarding the
prevalence of data fishing in law.58 Nevertheless, the prevalence of
this practice can easily be inferred based on (1) strong empirical
evidence of the prevalence of data fishing in the natural and social
sciences; and (2) empirical evidence of the “deeply flawed” “state of
empirical legal scholarship,”59 as well as the absence of
attentiveness to data fishing and certain other methodological
issues, or of safeguards against data fishing that are common in
other fields. Additionally, as explained below, the precise
prevalence of data fishing in law is not critical. Rather, the mere
opportunity to engage in this practice is often sufficient to cause
substantial harm.
First, there is substantial evidence from other fields,
including the natural and social sciences, that data fishing is
extremely common, and there is little reason to believe that it is
not as prevalent in legal scholarship as in other areas of the social
sciences.60 To the contrary, legal scholarship is behind many other
fields in its attentiveness to data fishing and methodology
in general.61
In a 2012 study, John et al. surveyed over two thousand
psychologists regarding their engagement in “questionable
research practices.”62 Among those psychologists, 63.4% admitted
to “failing to report all of a study’s dependent measures,” 55.9% of
participants in the study admitted to “[d]eciding whether to collect
more data after looking to see whether the results were
significant,” 45.8% admitted to “selectively reporting [in a paper]
studies that ‘worked’,” 38.2% admitted to “[d]eciding whether to
exclude data after looking at the impact of doing so on the results,”
and 27% admitted to “reporting [in a paper] an unexpected finding
as having been predicted from the start.”63 Over 90% of participants
“admitted to having engaged in at least one [questionable research
practice].”64 Further, because the study involved self-admission,
58 An empirical study by Lee Epstein and Gary King found “deep[ ] ”
methodological problems “[e]verywhere” in empirical legal scholarship, but, while the
authors discuss the invalidity of results produced by data fishing, they do not explicitly
address the prevalence of this practice in empirical legal scholarship. See Epstein &
King, supra note 1, at 6, 15, 54–55.
59 See id. at 6; infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
60 See NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 76–85.
61 See Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 6.
62 Leslie K. John et al., Measuring the Prevalence of Questionable Research
Practices with Incentives for Truth Telling, 23 PSYCH. SCI. 524 (2012).
63 Id. at 525.
64 Id. at 527.
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these prevalence estimates are likely to be grossly
underestimated.65 Indeed, prevalence estimates based on other
measures used in the study are substantially higher.66 According to
the authors:
One would infer from the [data] that nearly 1 in 10 research psychologists
has introduced false data into the scientific record and that the majority
of research psychologists have engaged in practices such as selective
reporting of studies, not reporting all dependent measures, collecting
more data after determining whether the results were significant,
reporting unexpected findings as having been predicted, and excluding
data post hoc.67

In another recent survey study (involving 807 ecologists
and evolutionary biologists), Fraser et al. found that “64% reported
cherry picking statistically significant results in at least one
publication; 42% reported p hacking by collecting more data after
first checking the statistical significance of results, and 51%
acknowledged reporting an unexpected finding as though it had
been hypothesized from the start.”68
In short, the prevalence of data fishing has been repeatedly
tested and confirmed in wide-ranging fields across the natural and
social sciences.69
Second, there is good reason to infer that empirical legal
research, which frequently draws on other fields in the social
sciences, such as economics and psychology, also suffers from
very high rates of data fishing.70 In fact, based on evidence that
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526–27.
67 Id. (cross-references omitted).
68 Hannah Fraser et al., Questionable Research Practices in Ecology and Evolution,
PLOS ONE 9 (July 16, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200303 [https://perma.cc/
FYC2-H8PY].
69 See id.; John et al., supra note 62, at 524 (citing studies, highlighting prevalence
of “questionable research practices,” and reporting results of survey suggesting that “some
questionable practices may constitute the prevailing research norm”); John P.A. Ioannidis,
Why Most Discovered True Associations Are Inflated, 19 EPIDEMIOLOGY 640, 640–43 (2008)
(highlighting that “[s]elective analyses and outcome reporting have been extensively
demonstrated in clinical-trials research comparing protocols against reported results” and
tabulating “articles suggesting that early studies give (on average) inflated estimates of effect”
across wide-ranging research fields); Yarkoni & Westfall, supra note 43, at 1100–02, 1103–04
(highlighting prevalence of data fishing and citing studies); Andrew Gelman, Too Good to Be
True, SLATE (July 24, 2013), https://slate.com/technology/2013/07/statistics-and-psychologymultiple-comparisons-give-spurious-results.html [https://perma.cc/R6UL-PPGK] (emphasizing
that data fishing “happens all the time,” is “standard practice[ ] ,” and is “considered acceptable”).
But see NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 97 (highlighting “methodological shortcomings” in
“quantitative assessment[s]” of “the prevalence of such inappropriate statistical practices as
p-hacking, cherry picking, and hypothesizing after results are known”).
70 While there is an absence of formal statistical examinations of the prevalence of
data fishing in empirical legal scholarship, the issue, as it pertains to law, has caught the
attention of various scholars. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 1, at 167–79 (“consider[ing] how
the scientific status of empirical legal scholarship might be enhanced” and recommending
65
66
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empirical legal scholarship often fails to adhere to well-accepted
methodological practices in the natural and social sciences, and
based on the absence of certain safeguards against data fishing
that are common in other fields, there is cause to believe that
data fishing is even more prevalent in law than in other fields.71
In 2001, Epstein and King conducted an empirical review of
legal scholarship and found “serious problems of inference and
methodology abound everywhere [that they found] empirical
research in the law reviews and in articles written by members of
the legal community.”72 Based on this study, they concluded that
“the current state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed”
and that there is “little awareness of, much less compliance with, the
rules of inference that guide empirical research in the social and
natural sciences.”73 As discussed above, however, data fishing is
prevalent even in fields in the natural and social sciences that are
particularly attentive to methodological challenges; it is therefore
likely that this practice is all the more prevalent in legal scholarship,
in which there is arguably less awareness of, and at least less
attentiveness to, methodological issues relative to other fields.
Furthermore, in empirical legal scholarship, there is a
noticeable absence of safeguards against data fishing (and certain
other undesirable methodological practices) common in other
fields. In some research fields, such as biomedicine, journals
require, or at least encourage, various procedures and
documentation aimed at protecting against data fishing and other
“stringent disclosure requirements designed to foster critical review and replication of
empirical legal research”); Ho & Rubin, supra note 17, at 17–19 (explaining “advances toward
credible causal inference that have wide application for empirical legal studies,” and
highlighting the principle that “[r]esearch design trumps methods of analysis”); Mark Klock,
Finding Random Coincidences While Searching for the Holy Writ of Truth: Specification
Searches in Law and Public Policy or Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1007
(2001) (discussing “specification searches” in law and “provid[ing] examples and case
studies”). See generally Epstein & King, supra note 1 (addressing the poor quality of empirical
research in legal scholarship).
71 Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 5–6.
72 Id. at 15. It is important to emphasize that there has been substantial growth
in attention to empirical legal research, and research methodology in particular, in recent
years. This includes the founding of the Society for Empirical Legal Studies (SELS), the
annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, and the Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies—a peer-review journal devoted to empirical studies related to law. See About
SELS, Society for Empirical Legal Studies, CORNELL L. SCH., https://community.lawschool.
cornell.edu/sels/about-sels/ [https://perma.cc/XV53-JHN7]; About the Journal, Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies, WILEY ONLINE LIBR., https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17401
461 [https://perma.cc/USP2-KN6S]. The SELS community and a number of others have made
significant progress and have elevated the credibility of empirical legal research; however, there
is still a long way to go, and even the total scholarship arising from these few research
communities constitutes only a relatively small proportion of empirical legal scholarship.
73 Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 6 (also remarking that “[t]he sustained, selfconscious attention to the methodology of empirical analysis so present in the journals in
traditional academic fields . . . is virtually nonexistent in the nation’s law reviews”).
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harmful research practices. These include signing ethics
statements, submitting protocols and analysis plans with the
manuscript, agreeing to share data, “preregistering” design and
analysis plans at an early stage of a researcher’s study, and
others.74 These requirements and practices do not exist in law, or
they are at least very rare.75 To the contrary, empirical research in
law falls behind many other fields in its attentiveness to data
fishing and other methodological issues.76 This is reflected in
Epstein and King’s conclusion that empirical legal scholarship
often fails to follow “rules of inference that guide empirical
research” in other fields.77 Arguably, this problem is only
exacerbated by the absence of peer review in many or most articleselection processes in legal scholarship.78
74 See, e.g., New Manuscripts, Statistical Reporting Guidelines, NEW ENG. J. MED.,
https://www.nejm.org/author-center/new-manuscripts [https://perma.cc/B83B-PAP4]
(recommending the following procedures, among others, and presumably accounting for
them during the submission and review process: submission of “final protocols and
statistical analysis plans (SAPs) . . . with the manuscript, as well as a table of amendments
made to the protocol and SAP indicating the date of the change and its content”; ensuring
that primary outcome analysis matches prespecified analysis in protocol (and providing
justification when a deviation occurs); submission of “a signed and dated version” of the
study’s “prespecified SAP with a description of hypotheses to be tested” for an observational
study if the study included such a plan; use of prespecified multiple-comparisons
adjustment methods; depositing of SAPs in an online repository (“encourage[d]”); use of
retesting and robustness checks (“encouraged”)); David Harrington et al., New Guidelines
for Statistical Reporting in the Journal, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285 (2019) (commenting on
new guidelines and requirements for reporting statistical results to better account for
“error that can result from uncritical interpretation of multiple inferences,” including the
possibility of unreported comparisons). See generally Chris Allen & David MA Mehler,
Open Science Challenges, Benefits and Tips in Early Career and Beyond (Oct. 17, 2018),
http://psyarxiv.com/3czyt [https://perma.cc/WSU9-YT54] (discussing benefits and costs of
“open science” methods for improving the reliability of empirical research); Epstein & King,
supra note 1, at 46 (describing requirements for publishing in a “leading empirical methods
journal,” including the requirement that authors “indicate in their first footnote in which
public archive readers can find the data, programs, recodes, or other information necessary
to replicate the numerical results in their article”). Note that certain types of clinical trials
outside of law must, by law, be preregistered. See 42 C.F.R. § 11.22.
75 It is true that research involving human subjects, in law, as in other fields,
often requires that a researcher submit a detailed design for approval by an institutional
review board (IRB) prior to obtaining or generating data. See HULLEY ET AL., supra note
41, at 227. These procedures may reduce the researcher’s methodological flexibility and
at least motivate the researcher to consider and record various methodological decisions
prior to observing any outcome data. But IRB approval is frequently not required for
empirical studies in legal scholarship, see id. at 227–28, and, although empirical research
in law can involve human subjects, human-subjects research is more common in other
fields, such as medicine and psychology. In any event, although IRB approval requires
and motivates some methodological prespecification, it rarely requires precise details of
a researcher’s intended statistical analysis—at least not to the level of detail that would
prevent data fishing. See id. at 227.
76 See Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 6; see also Zeiler, supra note 1, at 78, 78–86.
77 Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 6.
78 It has been suggested that the prevalence of methodological problems may
be greater in student-edited law reviews—the central forum for legal scholarship—than
in peer-review journals central to scholarship in other fields. See Zeiler, supra note 1, at
78–79. Epstein and King highlight the “astonish[ment]” that scholars in fields outside of
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Finally, regardless of the precise prevalence of data fishing
in legal scholarship, there is at least an enormous opportunity for
researchers to engage in and report results based on data fishing.
This opportunity is itself sufficient to cause far-reaching harm.
For example, a reader’s awareness that data fishing is
possible and that the researcher may have an interest in engaging
in data fishing is sufficient to cause the reader to distrust a study’s
results and the researcher’s claims, even if the researcher’s
methodology seems perfectly sound. Moreover, this environment—
in which researchers have the opportunity to engage in data fishing
without detection by readers—further incentivizes researchers to
engage in this practice. A researcher may assume that other
researchers are engaging in data fishing and that not engaging in
it will put the researcher at a disadvantage—for example, in
asserting arguments against other researchers or simply in
advancing her career. Additionally, a researcher may believe that
data fishing would create certain advantages, even if other
researchers are not engaged in it. The researcher also knows that
data fishing is relatively unverifiable, and there is no expectation
for her to show that she has not engaged in it. In this environment,
a prisoner’s dilemma may emerge, causing researchers to engage
in data fishing and readers to distrust empirical scholarship.
To be sure, the prisoner’s dilemma model perhaps
oversimplifies what is in fact occurring in empirical legal
scholarship. For example, readers are not entirely blind to data
fishing. They are also not entirely blind to a researcher’s
engagement in good statistical practices, thus allowing for
researchers to develop reputations for good empirical scholarship
and to have the incentive to develop such reputations. The point is,
however, that knowing the precise prevalence of data fishing in legal
scholarship is not necessary for our purposes. The opportunity for
researchers to engage in data fishing alone is sufficient to cause very
substantial harm. Therefore, even without empirical certainty
regarding the prevalence of data fishing in law, eliminating the
practice is crucial. As I discuss below, this can be accomplished by
implementing a few simple steps.
E.

The Prevalence of Data Fishing in Litigation

Data fishing is also prevalent in the courtroom. In litigation,
and expert evidence in particular, data fishing is often more overt. It
exacerbates the “hired-gun” problem—in which experts arrive at
law feel when they discover that acceptance decisions at top law journals are made by
students. Epstein & King, supra note 1, at 48.
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opinions based on who hires them rather than based on the truth—
and leads to an environment in which opposing experts battle over
methodology in an attempt to produce favorable testimony for their
respective litigant sponsors and in which the factfinder justifiably
distrusts expert testimony and often chooses a winner based on
inappropriate criteria.79 As in legal scholarship, the precise scale and
scope of data fishing in litigation is unknown. But, in this context
also, the prevalence of data fishing can easily be inferred.
Furthermore, the opportunity for data fishing itself is often
sufficient to cause far-reaching harm.
There are, in theory, safeguards in litigation against data
fishing, but they rarely stop it from occurring. Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 requires that an expert’s testimony be “the product of
reliable principles and methods” and that “the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”80 The
standard established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. requires that the trial court fulfill a “gatekeeping role” to
“ensur[e] that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”81 The court must
ensure that “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data,” that
it “is the product of reliable principles and methods,” and that “the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.”82 And the court must exclude testimony that is not “based
on scientifically valid principles.”83
Additionally, a party may challenge an expert’s data-fishing
practices on cross examination or may present to the jury evidence
of the invalidity of an expert’s results.84 Arguably, therefore, “the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of Evidence work together to
enable a well-prepared party to punish an adversary for its expert’s
use of data [fishing].”85
The problem is that these tools are generally not effective
in eliminating data fishing in the courtroom, except perhaps
(and only sometimes) in its most extreme form. Some courts
have excluded evidence based on data fishing, but most have not,
79 See Robertson, supra note 4, at 184–92; Jonah B. Gelbach, Expert Mining
and Required Disclosure, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 135–44 (2014); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1535–36 (1999).
80 FED. R. EVID. 702.
81 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
82 FED. R. EVID. 702.
83 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
84 See Gelbach, supra note 79, at 135–36.
85 Id. at 131, 136 (arguing that “[v]arious aspects of evidence and civil-procedure
law disincentivize data mining by expert witnesses in federal civil litigation,” but that
expert mining—“hiring multiple experts, asking each to provide an expert report on the
same issue, and then put[ting] on the stand only the one who provides the most favorable
report”—has the same effect as data mining).
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and it is difficult to say whether a jury discounts an expert’s
testimony based on a data-fishing challenge, or if they even
understand the concept of data fishing in the first instance.86 In
any event, it is rare for an expert to provide affirmative evidence
showing that she safeguarded against, or at least did not engage
in, data fishing.
In general, experts at least have the opportunity to engage
in data fishing by exploring data for results that will best support
their sponsors’ positions and selectively presenting their findings as
the products of confirmatory analysis. As a result, many cases
devolve into a “battle of the experts” in which opposing experts
debate methodology after potentially engaging in such exploration
to find the best methodological combinations to support their
respective sponsors.87 For example, in a discrimination case,
opposing experts often disagree on whether to include a particular
variable in a regression model. Commonly, such disagreements do
not arise from, e.g., differences in methodological schools; rather,
they often arise because the experts (or nontestifying experts hired
by the litigants) have previously explored the data and determined
which models most favor their respective sponsors’ legal positions.88
One way in which a litigant may be able to engage in data
fishing while bypassing scrutiny under Rule 702 and Daubert,
and on cross-examination, is by hiring a nontestifying expert
and taking care to stay within the protection of the attorneywork-product privilege. While testifying experts may be
required to disclose analysis on which they relied in forming
their opinions, analyses by nontestifying experts are generally
protected from disclosure.89 Therefore, a litigant may develop

86 See, e.g., In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1137
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting defendant’s argument that expert evidence should be inadmissible
based on the expert’s “engage[ment] in ‘p-hacking’ [i.e., data fishing], manipulation of data to
obtain statistically significant results”); Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 82
(3d Cir. 2017) (rejecting the district court’s determination that an expert engaged in a “sort of
subgrouping ‘analysis’” that constituted “data-snooping [i.e., data fishing], plain and simple”
without any “generally accepted statistical procedures . . . to correct his results for the likelihood
of a false indication of significance,” and concluding that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt applied an
incorrectly rigorous standard for reliability” (quoting Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC,
No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 4232600, at *13 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015))). But see Ohio Pub. Emps.
Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Co., No. 4:08-cv-0160, 2018 WL 3861840, at *7
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2018) (holding, based on precedent, that an expert’s choice of date for an
“event study was entirely improper because you are supposed to hypothesize and then see
your results”).
87 See generally Gelbach, supra note 79, at 131–34 (discussing “expert mining”
as analogous to data mining).
88 See infra Part IV.
89 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(D) (“Ordinarily, a party may not, by
interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or to
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statistical evidence by (1) hiring a nontestifying expert to perform
exploratory analysis on a dataset pertinent to the case and to
identify a methodology (including a model) that is favorable to the
litigant’s position; and then (2) hiring a separate testifying expert to
test hypotheses using the methodology identified by the
nontestifying expert and to testify regarding the results. The litigant
must be careful to ensure that the nontestifying expert’s analysis
remains within the protection of the work-product privilege—for
example, avoiding reliance by the testifying expert on the
nontestifying expert’s analysis. But, in general, the protections
established for nontestifying experts will allow a litigant to explore
the data, form a theory and methodology around the results
obtained from such exploration, and then hire a testifying expert to
testify regarding these results while excluding any information
regarding the nontestifying expert’s analysis.90 This way, the
testifying expert can assert on cross-examination, for example, that
she did not engage in data fishing, and that, to the contrary, she only
tested a particular hypothesis using a particular methodology.91
Even when this method is not used, it would not be
uncommon for an expert to testify regarding statistical results
produced by data fishing. Data fishing is prevalent and poorly
understood, and courts often require an extreme case of data fishing
to exclude the evidence under Rule 702 and Daubert.92 Additionally,
prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial.”). See generally
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (attorney work product); FED. R. EVID. 705.
90 A litigant can likely convey information to a testifying expert, or at least bias
a testifying expert in the direction of one methodology or another based on a
nontestifying expert’s analysis, while avoiding direct reliance on it by the testifying
expert. See generally Robertson, supra note 4, at 185–86 (discussing “psychological
heuristics” used by litigants (or their attorneys) to bias experts in their favor).
91 A similar way for a litigant to engage in a type of indirect data fishing while
avoiding the negative repercussions of overt data fishing by an individual expert is to
engage in a problematic practice called “expert mining,” or “witness shopping.” Gelbach,
supra note 79, at 131 (“expert mining”); Posner, supra note 79, at 1541 (“witness
shopping”). This practice involves “hiring multiple experts, asking each to provide an
expert report on the same issue, and then put[ting] on the stand only the one who
provides the most favorable report,” or, in particular, “directing each to conduct a single
test until one turns up a helpful result.” Gelbach, supra note 79, at 131, 136; see also
Posner, supra note 79, at 1541–42 (“Suppose the lawyer for the plaintiff hired the first
economist, agronomist, physicist, physician, etc. whom he interviewed, and the lawyer
for the defendant hired the twentieth one whom he interviewed. A reasonable inference
is that the defendant’s case is weaker than the plaintiff ’ s. The parallel is to conducting
twenty statistical tests of a hypothesis and reporting (as significant at the five percent
level) the only one that supported the hypothesis being tested.”).
92 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Compare In re Roundup Prods. Liab.
Litig., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2018), and Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works,
LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 82–84 (3d Cir. 2017), with Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan
Mortg. Co., No. 4:08-cv-0160, 2018 WL 3861840, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2018), and Bell v.
Ascendant Sols., Inc., No. Civ.A. 301-cv-0166N, 2004 WL 1490009, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 1,
2004) (excluding study that identified “information days” that “appear[ed] to be consciously
chosen in order artificially to support [the expert’s] hypothesis”).
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although a jury may consider an expert’s engagement in data fishing
in evaluating the expert’s testimony, an opposing party may
encounter various difficulties in using data fishing to discredit
the evidence. These include proving that an opposing party actually
engaged in data fishing, explaining to the jury why data fishing is
problematic, and, relatedly, avoiding giving the jury the impression
that the litigant opposing the evidence is focused on data fishing only
because the litigant has a weak substantive argument.
To be sure, data fishing in litigation is somewhat distinct
from data fishing in legal scholarship. Litigants generally do not
purport to assert neutral research claims. Instead, they advocate for
a legal position and offer support for it. Litigants are overt in offering
evidence that supports their positions, and the exploration of data
by experts (as well as the prior vetting of experts) is often expected.
On the other hand, expert testimony is expected to reflect the
witness’s expert opinion. And, in any case, data fishing in litigation,
like data fishing in scholarship, is very damaging. Courtroom battles
between experts frequently boil down to the hired-gun problem: each
expert offers testimony to support his sponsor’s position. The experts
search for and selectively present methodologies that lead to results
that are favorable to their respective sponsors. This disingenuous
battle causes confusion and distrust among jurors, and it leads to a
wide range of harms, including inaccuracy, unpredictability, and
loss of faith in the courts.
Finally, as in scholarship, regardless of the precise
prevalence of data fishing in the courtroom, the opportunity for
experts to engage in this practice is sufficient to cause substantial
harm. The jury is aware of the expert’s bias in favor of his litigant
sponsor, as well as his opportunity to search for and selectively
report favorable results. The jury, therefore, has substantial reason
to distrust the expert’s claims even if the expert’s methodology
seems sound.93 Furthermore, in this environment, experts are
incentivized to engage in data fishing in order to maintain a
substantive advantage over an opposing expert, or at least to
prevent an opposing expert from herself gaining an advantage. The
litigation may consequently devolve into one in which experts
engage in data fishing and juries justifiably distrust expert
testimony and choose winners based on inappropriate criteria. This
devolution applies equally in cases in which a litigant hires a
nontestifying expert to perform exploratory analysis prior to hiring
a testifying expert.

93 For obvious reasons, this analysis does not apply equally to court-appointed
experts. See FED. R. EVID. 706.
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Again, this model may be overly simplistic in certain
respects, but it illustrates the point that the opportunity to
engage in data fishing is itself sufficient to cause inaccuracy,
unpredictability, and loss of faith in the courts.
II.

ELIMINATING DATA FISHING WITH DASS

One of the most remarkable features of data fishing is
how comprehensively it can be resolved, relative to the harm
that it causes, with attentiveness to the problem by researchers
and readers. In this Part, I draw on methods in statistics and
other fields to propose a concrete framework for eliminating data
fishing in law. Its steps can be summarized using the acronym
DASS, for Design, Analyze, Scrutinize, and Substantiate. The
first three steps (Design, Analyze, and Scrutinize) directly
safeguard against data fishing. The fourth step (Substantiate)
indirectly safeguards against data fishing by requiring evidence
that the researcher has adhered to this framework. In this Part,
I explain these steps and discuss their implementation. Then, in
the following Part, I discuss a method that would allow a
researcher to perform useful exploratory analysis while
adhering to DASS.
A.

Design Before Analysis

The first principle of DASS is based on the idea of
methodological prespecification: the researcher should design
the study and record it in a protocol prior to analyzing the data.94
This means that, prior to beginning analysis—and, ideally, prior
to having any access to outcome data—the researcher must
carefully determine the design of the study, where “design”
means “all contemplating, collecting, organizing, and analyzing
of data that takes place prior to seeing any outcome data.”95
As part of the design, the researcher should define all
estimands and estimators—the objects that the researcher
intends to estimate and what the researcher intends to use to

94 See Donald B. Rubin, For Objective Causal Inference Design Trumps Analysis,
2 ANNALS OF APPLIED STAT. 808, 810, 816–17 (2008) (“[O]utcome-free design is absolutely
critical for objectivity.”); D. James Greiner, What Do Statisticians Really Need to Know,
and When Do They Need to Know It?, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING
BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 167, 175–78 (Christopher T. Robertson
& Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016).
95 Rubin, supra note 94, at 810, 812; Donald B. Rubin, The Design versus the
Analysis of Observational Studies for Causal Effects: Parallels with the Design of Randomized
Trials, 26 STAT. MED. 20, 21 (2007); see also Ho & Rubin, supra note 17, at 27–28.
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estimate them.96 The design also specifies all other fundamental
components of a study—for example, the research units,
treatment levels, covariates, outcome variables, sampling
methodology, etc.97 It identifies how the researcher intends to
analyze the outcome data.98 This includes details regarding the
researcher’s intended hypothesis testing, levels of significance,
data transformations, multiple-comparisons methods, and other
components of the researcher’s intended analysis.
In short, the researcher should specify the study’s
methodology99 and should record its details in a research
protocol. To the extent that it is not possible or practicable to
record all important methodological details in the study’s
protocol, the researcher should at least specify the primary
details of the study’s methodology.100 The more detail the

96 For example, in a study to determine the average age of personnel in a
certain branch of the military, the researcher may define her primary estimand as
∑
...
=
, the mean age of every person in that branch of the military, where
𝜇=
𝑥 is the age of person i; and she may define her primary estimator as
∑
...
=
, the mean age of a random sample of n people in that branch of the
𝑥̅ =
military. Defining estimands and estimators is frequently not simple, let alone obvious.
For example, a researcher studying whether a drug has a causal effect on pain must
precisely define a causal effect, as well as how such an effect will be estimated. Defining
an estimand may involve the researcher asking herself, for example, “if I had all of the
data I could ever need or want—even data that, in the real world, would be impossible
to obtain—how would I compute the causal effect?” Defining an estimator, then, may
involve the researcher asking herself, “given that I cannot obtain all of the data that I would
need to compute the estimand, what computation can I perform to best estimate it using
the data that I will have?” For a discussion surrounding the definition of estimands and
estimators in a recent experimental study, see The Effects of CCG, supra note 37, at 429.
97 See Rubin, supra note 95, at 21, 33.
98 See Rubin, supra note 94, at 811–12 (“[F]or example, design includes
conceptualization of the study and analyses of covariate data used to create matched
treated-control samples or to create subclasses, each with similar covariate distributions
for the treated and control subsamples, as well as the specification of the primary analysis
plan for the outcome data.”).
99 I use the term methodology to include all facets of the study’s design and
analysis (or intended analysis, depending on the context).
100 Additionally, in certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to have multiple
design phases. For example, in the experimental setting, a researcher will often be interested
in testing whether the randomization of units to treatment levels led to covariate balance—
that the background characteristics of units are balanced across treatment levels. In this case,
prior to randomization, the researcher may complete an initial design that contemplates a
number of analytical possibilities based on whether and to what extent the randomization
achieved covariate balance. Then, after randomization and data collection, the researcher can
analyze the covariate data without accessing the study’s outcome data. Finally, once the
covariate data has been analyzed but prior to accessing the outcome data, the researcher
would complete the study’s design based on the results of the researcher’s analysis of the
covariate data. See, e.g., The Effects of CCG, supra note 37, at 426–28 (describing analysis of
covariate data in “secondary design phase”). See generally Rubin, supra note 94 (emphasizing
the importance of careful study design); Greiner, supra note 94 (discussing “blinding”—
keeping certain information from a researcher—as a tool for improving statistical analysis
and causal inference in particular).
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researcher provides, the more credible she will be in asserting her
statistical claims.101
The researcher should complete the design phase of the
study prior to seeing the outcome data, and, ideally, prior even to
having access to the outcome data. I discuss this component further
in Section II.C.
Once the design is complete and the researcher has specified
her methodology, the researcher may proceed to the analysis phase
of the study. Ideally, this simply involves following the methodology
established and recorded in the study’s design phase. If deviations
from this prespecified methodology are necessary, they should be
declared and explained in the study’s report.
B.

Scrutinizing the Study’s Methodology and Results

Once the researcher has completed the design and
analysis phases of her study, she should turn her attention to
scrutinizing her methodology and results. Of course, a good
researcher carefully scrutinizes her methodology during the
design phase of a study. At this later point of the study, however,
the researcher has access to the outcome data and to the results
of her study. The primary point of this element of DASS is for
the researcher to use “sensitivity analysis” to examine the
robustness of her results to different methodologies and to
explain the reasoning for and the weaknesses associated with
the study’s methodology and results.102
Note that terms such as “validate” and “support” would
be less suitable than “scrutinize” to describe this element of
DASS. The key to fulfilling this element is for the researcher to
perform an earnest examination of her methodology and results.
The point is not for the researcher to advocate for or to prove the
robustness of her results or strength of her methodology. Rather,
101 See generally Mitchell, supra note 1, at 176, 186–87, 197–204 (discussing
importance of transparency in empirical research and recommending adoption of “stringent
disclosure requirements for reports of original empirical research [in law], including
disclosure of detailed information about methodology, data analysis, and the availability of
raw data for replication and review”). Mitchell emphasizes the importance of providing “the
details necessary for others to simulate one’s methods to check for similar results.” Id. at 185.
DASS is of course consistent with the overarching message of Mitchell’s proposal—the need
for transparency. Note, however, that DASS is premised on the notion that strict disclosure
requirements (and, particularly, those imposed by journals) are neither sufficient nor
necessary to safeguard against data fishing. Additionally, DASS is intended to serve as a
simple and concrete standard, but one that is sufficiently flexible to be applied (by researchers
and readers directly) to a wide range of research settings and conditions.
102 The researcher can incorporate guidelines for such analysis in her design.
Note that sensitivity analysis has numerous functions in statistics. See, e.g., ANDREW
GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS 141–62, 184–85, 435–36 (3d ed. 2014)
(discussing sensitivity analysis in Bayesian statistics).
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it is more in line with Richard Feynman’s comments regarding
“cargo cult science”—a term Feynman used to describe a sort of
fake science—in his 1974 Caltech commencement address:
[T]here is one feature I notice that is generally missing in cargo cult science.
That is the idea that we all hope you have learned in studying science in
school—we never explicitly say what this is, but just hope that you catch on
by all the examples of scientific investigation. . . . It’s a kind of scientific
integrity, a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter
honesty—a kind of leaning over backwards. For example, if you’re doing an
experiment, you should report everything that you think might make it
invalid—not only what you think is right about it: other causes that could
possibly explain your results; and things you thought of that you’ve
eliminated by some other experiment, and how they worked—to make sure
the other fellow can tell they have been eliminated.
Details that could throw doubt on your interpretation must be given,
if you know them. You must do the best you can—if you know anything
at all wrong, or possibly wrong—to explain it. If you make a theory, for
example, and advertise it, or put it out, then you must also put down all
the facts that disagree with it, as well as those that agree with it. There
is also a more subtle problem. When you have put a lot of ideas together
to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when explaining
what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things that gave you
the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes something else
come out right, in addition.
In summary, the idea is to try to give all of the information to help
others to judge the value of your contribution; not just the information
that leads to judgment in one particular direction or another.103

I finally settled on the term “scrutinize” to express this
element of DASS. It entails a sincere examination by the researcher
of her results. As Feynman emphasized,
The first principle is that you must not fool yourself—and you are the
easiest person to fool. So you have to be very careful about that. After you’ve
not fooled yourself, it’s easy not to fool other scientists. You just have to be
honest in a conventional way after that.104

This element is more of an art than a science. The goal is
to examine the study’s methodology and whether and how the
study’s results would differ under reasonable alternative
methodologies. It involves identifying the study’s primary
methodological features and examining the sensitivity of the
103 RICHARD
P. FEYNMAN, “SURELY YOU’RE JOKING, MR. FEYNMAN!”:
ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER 385–86 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2018) (1985).
104 Id. at 387; see also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 176 (discussing importance of
transparency in empirical research and recommending adoption of “stringent disclosure
requirements for reports of original empirical research [in law], including disclosure of
detailed information about methodology, data analysis, and the availability of raw data
for replication and review”).
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study’s results to changes in those features. It also entails
explaining why the study’s primary methodological features were
chosen and examining how the results would differ using
reasonable alternatives. For example, the researcher might test
whether her results differ when she measures central tendency
using the median rather than the mean, or whether her results
differ when she addresses outlying data by winsorizing the data at
the 99th percentile rather than the 95th percentile, or a
combination of the two.
How extensively a researcher should examine alternative
methodologies depends on a number of factors. First, how plausible
are the alternatives? If the researcher’s choice of a particular
methodological feature is an obvious choice that stands above all
other choices, there may be less of a need to examine alternatives
for this feature. If, on the other hand, there are multiple options
that stand on equal footing, then a thorough sensitivity analysis
may be necessary. If there are many plausible alternatives, a
researcher may attempt to identify the most important
alternatives, test them, and use the results to determine whether
further tests are necessary.
Second, how detailed is the research protocol; and did the
researcher complete the study’s design prior to accessing the
outcome data, and can she prove it? If the researcher is unable to
evidence that she completed the study’s design prior to analyzing
the outcome data, the reader should read the study skeptically. But
the reader’s skepticism may be overcome if the researcher can
prove, by scrutinizing her results, that the study’s results should
be trusted. If, on the other hand, the researcher can show that she
completed the study’s design prior to beginning her analysis, the
researcher’s scrutinization, although still important to
demonstrate the robustness of the study’s results, may be less
critical, since readers have more reason to trust the study based on
the researcher’s adherence to the design-before-analysis principle.
It is important to realize that, if the researcher tests
alternative methodologies and obtains results that are inconsistent
with those in her primary analysis, this does not necessarily
invalidate her study’s results. The researcher must consider why
her results differ based on different acceptable methodologies and
whether the results under her chosen methodology are meaningful
notwithstanding their sensitivity to such changes. Generally, she
should report the results of her sensitivity analysis and explain to
the reader her theory regarding why the inconsistencies arise and
whether they invalidate her study’s results. Inconsistencies should
be expected, and frequently there are good explanations for them
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and for why a study’s results are meaningful notwithstanding their
sensitivity to certain changes in methodology. A cautious researcher
may also incorporate in her study design a specific plan to account
for the possibility of such inconsistencies.
In summary, the scrutinize element is about examining
and being transparent regarding a study’s methodology and the
robustness of the researcher’s results to changes in methodology.
The spirit of this element of DASS is in stark contrast to that of
data fishing, which involves searching for methodologies that
produce favorable results and effectively hiding (or at least
lacking transparency regarding) alternative methodologies that
produce unfavorable results. The process of scrutinizing one’s
own results with sensitivity analysis is a key component to
safeguarding against data fishing and to gaining a reader’s trust
generally. At the same time, the reader should expect this in a
study and should be cautious when an empirical study does not
include such self-scrutinization.
C.

Substantiating Adherence to DASS

The aim of this article is to facilitate the elimination of
data fishing and the restoration of trust in empirical legal
research. This goal requires not only principles for safeguarding
against data fishing, but also a process that allows readers to
know whether and to what extent a researcher has applied these
principles. In turn, the researcher’s awareness that a reader will
know the extent to which the researcher has followed DASS and
will credit or discredit the study’s results accordingly will
incentivize careful adherence to its elements. Thus, providing
readers with evidence of the researcher’s adherence to DASS is
fundamental for achieving both the aims of the researcher, who
is interested in promoting her research, and the aims of readers,
who are interested in consuming credible research. This element
of DASS is central to its effectiveness and represents an
important advancement over current practices in the natural
and social sciences.105 Moreover, as mentioned in the
105 Although the focus of DASS’s substantiate element is the provision of evidence to
readers directly rather than the fulfillment of requirements enforced by journals, law journals
have a strong incentive to consider evidence of an author’s adherence to DASS’s principles in
deciding whether to extend an offer of publication. Journals are incentivized to publish credible
research, and an author’s adherence to DASS’s principles is significant in this respect. In this
sense, the substantiate element allows researchers to signal credibility to journals as well as to
readers. This effect may help to counterbalance a researcher’s concern regarding her adherence
to DASS in light of the well-evidenced phenomenon that journals have a tendency to publish
results that are statistically significant over those that are not. See Zeiler, supra note 1, at 82;
Ioannidis et al., supra note 1, at F241; NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 91–103.
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Introduction, it is arguably of particular importance in legal
scholarship, which frequently does not involve a peer-review
selection process for articles.106
The first step is for the researcher to establish evidence
that she completed the study’s design prior to analyzing the
study’s outcome data and that her analysis follows her
prespecified methodology. There are various methods for
accomplishing this. First, the researcher should specify her
design in writing and record it, ideally, by publishing it,
“preregistering” it, or at least privately uploading it
electronically with a timestamp. Electronic forums have been
developed specifically to facilitate protocol preregistration and
similar practices.107 Alternatively, SSRN (Social Science
Research Network), a popular forum for posting working papers
in law and other fields, can be used to post research protocols
privately or publicly.108 SSRN is well suited for this practice and
would likely be willing to incorporate additional features to
further accommodate it.
Alternatively, a researcher can establish a small committee
of colleagues and use this committee to facilitate evidencing her
adherence to the design-before-analysis principle by submitting a
timestamped protocol to the committee prior to beginning data
collection or analysis. In some cases, this may be as simple as
emailing the committee a final version of the study’s protocol. The
researcher can also use the committee to facilitate restrictions on
the researcher’s access to data and other safeguards. Like
preregistration or uploading a research design to SSRN, this
practice is simple, and it does not place any substantial burden on
the researcher or on the members of the committee.
Whichever practice the researcher chooses to apply, the
researcher should substantiate her adherence to DASS by
specifying in her report which of these safeguards she used (e.g.,
106 In legal scholarship, the substantiate element may therefore be of particular
importance to both readers and journals.
107 See, e.g., Preregistration, CTR. FOR OPEN SCI., https://www.cos.io/initiatives/prereg
[https://perma.cc/NEZ7-3G8J].
108 Some researchers may have concerns regarding the idea of publicizing a research
protocol, especially at an early stage of a study. Researchers, however, have numerous options
for recording the protocol privately. Although sometimes ideal, it is frequently not necessary
to publicize a study’s design prior to publishing the study’s report. Furthermore, in some
circumstances, it may be necessary or desirable to avoid sharing a record of a study’s protocol
with readers, even after the study’s report has been published. In these circumstances, a
researcher would nevertheless have options for evidencing that she completed the study’s
design prior to analyzing the outcome data and that her analysis complied with the study’s
prespecified methodology. For example, the researcher could utilize a committee of colleagues
(see text accompanying notes 108–109), a neutral third party, or a confidentiality agreement
to facilitate such proof.

538

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

preregistration or establishing a committee) and by signaling to
the reader the researcher’s ability to provide further evidence of
such safeguards.109
Experimental studies are ideal for exercising and
evidencing design-before-analysis practice. This is because the
researcher generally has control over the timing of her access to
the study’s outcome data. In this context, the researcher can
complete and record her protocol prior to collecting data and
therefore can easily prove to readers that she has prespecified
her methodology. If the researcher wishes to begin data
collection while completing certain aspects of the protocol, the
researcher can still evidence her strict adherence to designbefore-analysis practice by restricting (verifiably) her access to
the data (e.g., with the help of a committee, IT department, or
otherwise) until the protocol is recorded as complete.
Although experimental studies are ideal for exercising
and proving design-before-analysis practice, most empirical
studies in law are observational rather than experimental.
Generally, contrary to experimental studies, the data in an
observational study already exists, and the researcher often
lacks control over the timing of her access to the data.
Consequently, it can be more difficult for a researcher to prove
that she prespecified her methodology. Indeed, the researcher
will frequently have full access to the data—for example, public
data available on the internet—prior to beginning the study
design or even conceiving the idea for the study in the first
instance. These circumstances call for special care: while
proving adherence to DASS can be more difficult for
observational studies, adherence to DASS is arguably most
important for these studies in particular.110
For some observational studies, the researcher will have
control over when she gains access to the outcome data. For
example, if a district attorney promises to provide certain
prosecution data to a researcher, the researcher can instruct the
109 The researcher should be able and willing to provide certain relevant
records—e.g., a timeline (see infra notes 110–112 and accompanying text), a record of
when the researcher gained access to the study’s outcome data, preregistration records
or a letter from an established committee attesting to the researcher’s completion of the
study’s design prior to accessing any outcome data, a record of the study’s protocol, or
other records, depending on the circumstances. See also supra note 108. Note that I do
not mean to suggest that DASS, and the substantiation element in particular, should
replace safeguards instituted by journals. To the contrary, journal requirements aimed
at safeguarding against data fishing only complement and further DASS’s principles.
110 Experimental studies are frequently considered the “gold standard” for empirical
research. Rubin, supra note 94, at 808 (“For obtaining causal inferences that are objective,
and therefore have the best chance of revealing scientific truths, carefully designed and
executed randomized experiments are generally considered to be the gold standard.”).
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district attorney to refrain from giving her access to the data until
she informs him otherwise. Alternatively, the researcher can
create a committee or other “neutral” entity that would receive the
data and withhold access to it until instructed otherwise by the
researcher. In either case, the researcher can then complete and
record her study design, and establish evidence of her completion
time, prior to gaining access to the outcome data. She would
maintain her research protocol and a verifiable record of when she
completed (and recorded) her design, when she requested the data,
when she obtained the data, and when she began her analysis.
Most importantly, the researcher should establish and maintain
evidence of (1) when she completed her study design, and (2) when
she gained access to and when she actually accessed the outcome
data (as applicable).111
For observational studies in which the researcher has
little or no control over the timing of her access to the outcome
data, the researcher must turn to weaker modes of proof and
therefore must rely more heavily on DASS’s scrutinization
component. First, regardless of whether she can substantiate
her timing, she should maintain a record of when she completed
her design, when she accessed the outcome data (and, if
applicable, when she gained access to the outcome data), and
any other timepoints and occurrences that may be important for
establishing that she completed her design prior to analyzing the
data. For example, if a researcher has had access to a public
dataset on the internet, she may maintain a record of when she
completed her design, when she discovered the dataset,
occasions on which she accessed the data prior to completing her
design and what she did with the data on those occasions, and
when she began her analysis. Second, in reporting the study’s
results, the researcher should be transparent regarding her
access to and use of the data prior to completing the study’s
design. She may also include relevant timepoints.
In addition to evidencing the researcher’s completion of
the design prior to her analysis of the outcome data (and
reporting any access to and use of the data prior to completing
the study’s design), the researcher should substantiate her
adherence to the scrutinize element simply by reporting the
111 If, for example, the researcher had no option other than to gain access to the
data from the prosecutor prior to completing the study’s design, but assuming that she
could nevertheless establish and maintain evidence that she refrained from actually
accessing the data prior to completing her design—e.g., evidence from an access record
maintained by the technology hosting the data—she should record and maintain this
evidence. This evidence is somewhat weaker than evidence that the prosecutor had not
yet granted her access to the data, but it is likely convincing nevertheless.
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primary results of her sensitivity analysis and providing a
summary of her analysis and any other relevant information
(such as weaknesses in the study’s methodology) that would help
the reader to assess the study’s results.
Regardless of whether and to what degree the researcher
has control over the timing of her access to the study’s outcome
data, and regardless of the strength of the evidence of her
adherence to DASS, a key component of DASS’s substantiate
element is this: the researcher should include in the study’s report
a statement attesting to whether and to what degree she adhered
to DASS’s principles. In essence, adhering to DASS means taking
deliberate steps to avoid data fishing and to present results
transparently and honestly—and, in particular, following its
design-before-analysis,
scrutinization,
and
substantiation
principles.112 The first step in substantiating such adherence is
simply stating (in the text or a footnote, perhaps at the start of the
report’s methodology section) whether the researcher has in fact
adhered to DASS by following these principles.113 Beyond this
statement, it is the researcher’s responsibility to convince the
reader of such adherence with additional details.
In particular, once the researcher has indicated her
adherence to DASS’s principles, she should provide details that
would strengthen or weaken this claim. These may include any
steps that the researcher has taken to fulfill the design-beforeanalysis, scrutinization, and substantiation elements of DASS and
a reference to the reported results of the researcher’s sensitivity
analysis. They should also include any weaknesses in the
researcher’s adherence to DASS, such as instances in which the
researcher accessed the data prior to completing the study’s design,
as well as any qualifications or steps that the researcher took to
rectify these weaknesses.
Note that a reader’s expectations may sensibly depend on
the circumstances of the study. For example, a reader may be more
forgiving of a researcher’s access to data prior to her completion of
the study design if preventing such access would have been
impossible or impractical. On the other hand, the reader may be
less forgiving if the researcher did not take proper precautions to
ensure completion of her design prior to obtaining access to
outcome data in an experimental setting. Of course, this is only
part of the story: some fixed level of substantiation may be expected
See infra Conclusion for a detailed discussion of what it means to adhere to DASS.
See generally Joe Simmons et al., A 21 Word Solution, DIALOGUE (Soc’y for
Personality & Soc. Psych.), Fall 2012, at 4–7, https://spsp.org/sites/default/files/dialogue_26%
282%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2PN-N767] (“If you did not p-hack a finding, say it, and your
results will be evaluated with the greater confidence they deserve.”).
112
113
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and required to afford the study credibility, regardless of the
circumstances. But some dependence on circumstance is
reasonable and useful. It is reasonable, because a researcher’s
failure to fulfill the substantiate element when substantiation is
feasible may signal that the researcher has not adhered to DASS’s
principles. And it is useful, because many important studies may
require investigation under subideal circumstances in which a high
degree of substantiation would be impossible; and an
uncompromising refusal to afford such studies credit would
disincentivize potentially important research.
In any event, the reader should consider whether the
researcher has at least attested to her adherence to DASS’s
principles. Based on the circumstances, this, in combination
with the researcher’s scrutinization of her results, may satisfy
the reader that the researcher’s results are credible.
The substantiate element of DASS is critical. Ideally, a
researcher will strive to adhere to the design-before-analysis
and scrutinize standards in a way that could be described, in
Feynman’s words, as “a kind of utter honesty—a kind of leaning
over backwards.”114 Ultimately, however, it is up to the
researcher to substantiate this adherence, and for the reader to
judge it based on the evidence—and to credit the researcher’s
results accordingly.
III.

THE NEED FOR DATA EXPLORATION

A researcher should complete her study design prior to
analyzing the outcome data; however, good study design often
requires data exploration. Pilot studies and training datasets satisfy
this need without violating the principles of DASS. In particular, the
design-before-analysis principle requires that a researcher complete
her study design prior to analyzing the outcome data to which she
intends to apply her study design. Engaging in exploratory analysis
and using the results of that analysis to inform the researcher’s
study design is not violative of DASS and does not constitute data
fishing so long as the researcher is transparent regarding her
exploration and uses a dataset for her exploratory analysis that is
different from the one to which she intends to apply her study design.
In the experimental context, “pilot studies” are commonly
used to perform exploratory analysis and hone study design.115
FEYNMAN, supra note 103, at 385.
See generally Pilot Studies: Common Uses and Misuses, NAT’L CTR. FOR
COMPLEMENTARY & INTEGRATIVE HEALTH, https://www.nccih.nih.gov/grants/pilot-studiescommon-uses-and-misuses [https://perma.cc/32L5-9JW6] (discussing uses and misuses of
pilot studies).
114
115
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Pilot studies provide an opportunity for a researcher to perform
exploratory research and to learn from such exploration prior to
beginning the “main study.” In the observational context,
“training datasets” are used to perform exploratory analysis,
while the researcher’s study design is ultimately applied to the
study’s “testing dataset.” I begin this Part by explaining how a
researcher can engage in exploratory analysis using pilot studies
without violating the principles of DASS. I then explain why the
same reasoning applies to exploration using training datasets in
the observational context and discuss methods for partitioning a
dataset into training data and testing data for exploration and
testing, respectively.
A.

Pilot Studies

Pilot studies serve an important purpose: they are used
to detect design flaws and gain other useful information for a
study’s design prior to undertaking a costly full-blown
experiment. Pilot studies involve a researcher’s analysis of the
pilot study’s outcome data for the purpose of orienting the design
of the main study.116 We must therefore ask whether this
practice causes the same problems that arise from data fishing.
A key distinction between exploration using pilot studies
and data fishing is that, in the former, the researcher analyzes
outcome data from the pilot study rather than the main study—
that is, from a dataset that is distinct from the data that the
researcher ultimately uses to test her hypotheses. Consequently,
contrary to data fishing, exploration in a pilot study does not
cause false positives. Furthermore, although pilot studies can be
used to give false impressions, this risk can be minimized
through attentiveness to the scrutinize element of DASS.
1. False Positives
Data fishing causes false positives.117 However, analyzing
data in a pilot study and using the pilot study results to decide
on methodological factors in the main study does not cause false
positives in the main study. This is because the main study
involves a new set of data.
A 0.05 level of significance reflects a certain tolerance for
false positives (a rate of 5%). False positives occur because there
is randomness in a sample of data, and 5% of the time, the
116
117

See id.
See supra Section I.C.1.
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observed test statistic (e.g., difference in means) will be
sufficiently extreme to be “significant” as a result of the
randomness from sample to sample rather than a true effect. If,
for example, a researcher engages in data fishing by performing
one hundred hypothesis tests in search of significant results,
and, in each, the null hypothesis is in fact true (meriting
acceptance rather than rejection via a finding of significance),
then we would nevertheless expect five significant results (5% =
5/100) due to randomness alone—that is, five false positives.
Therefore, if a researcher only reports significant results
without informing the reader of her exploratory analysis or
otherwise accounting for expected false positives, then she
substantially understates the rate of false positives, and her
findings of significance may well be spurious. On the other hand,
if the researcher uses a pilot study to identify methodological
combinations that yield significant results and then applies
those particular combinations to the data in the main study—a
new sample entirely—then, if the results are indeed spurious,
these methodological combinations are highly unlikely to
produce significant results in the new sample. After all, if a
finding of significance in the pilot sample is spurious, it occurred
by randomness alone; at a 0.05 level of significance, there is only
a 5% chance of recurrence in the main study.
Similar reasoning applies to the related problem of
overfitting. If, in the pilot study, a methodology is selected to fit
the pilot data too tightly, and thereby to obtain a significant
result in the pilot study, then the researcher is, in a sense,
misinterpreting sampling variation as a true characteristic of
the population; therefore, as in the example above, applying this
methodological combination to a new set of data in the main
study is likely to yield a nonsignificant result. Contrary to data
fishing, using a pilot study for exploration facilitates a balance
between fitting a model, or methodology, to the pilot data on the
one hand and ensuring that it is sufficiently general to apply to
the main study’s data on the other hand. In other words,
exploration of data in a pilot study discourages overfitting
because an overfitted model will generate poor results in the
main study.
2. False Impressions
Even putting aside false positives, data fishing misleads
the reader.118 By searching for and selectively reporting
118

See supra Section I.C.2.
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significant results, the researcher causes readers to believe that
the study’s results are more robust and replicable than they
actually are. Readers are generally interested in experimental
results only insofar as the results tell us about the real world—
that is, only insofar as the results apply with some robustness
rather than apply only under the precise set of conditions in the
experiment, even if the results could be replicated using an
identical methodological combination in a new sample. In other
words, readers are interested in results that are method
replicable as well as sample replicable.119 Data fishing, however,
often involves reporting results in a way that gives the reader
the impression that the results are generalizable to a robust set
of real-world conditions when in fact they are not.
Exploratory analysis in a pilot study can also be used to
create false impressions in the main study if the researcher
cherry-picks a methodology in the pilot study and then applies it
in the main study. The risk of overfitting prevents this practice to
some extent, since overfitting will result in false positives (in the
pilot study) and therefore nonsignificance in the main study.
Sometimes, however, the researcher, through her exploration of
different methodologies, will detect a true characteristic of the
population; but her selective reporting of the result will cause the
reader to believe that it is more robust and replicable than it is.
Consider again the example above from The Effects of
CCG.120 As Table 2 in Section I.B shows, only one
methodological combination out of eight yields a negative causal
effect of the intervention on the outcome variable. It is possible
that this result could be the product of overfitting and therefore
not replicable in a new sample. However, it is also possible that
this negative effect reflects a true signal—for example, that
defining the outcome variable in terms of a mean rather than
median damages award (in the punitive damages setting) yields
a negative effect. This effect may well be sample replicable. But,
even assuming that it is, the result may be misleading to readers
if a researcher discovers this negative effect in a pilot study,
cherry-picks the one methodological combination that yields this
effect for application in the main study, and then, after obtaining
a negative effect in the main study, reports this result in
isolation of the other seven possibilities, none of which yields a
negative effect.
Here, the result reported may be perfectly correct—that
is, it may be correct to conclude that the intervention causes a
119
120

See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
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negative effect on the mean of punitive damages awards when
winsorizing at the 95th percentile. This result is not a false
positive. The problem is that repeating this methodology in the
main study and reporting the result in isolation of its context
(i.e., without explaining why the researcher chose the particular
methodology that she chose) may give the false impression that
the result is more robust than it really is—that it is method
replicable, and that, for example, the observed negative effect
would occur if the median or log mean were used to define the
outcome variable. As discussed above, this false impression may
arise due to the reader’s assumption that the researcher has
designed the study based on neutral criteria rather than on what
methodology would produce a favorable result. If the researcher
has cherry-picked a favorable result, it is far less likely to be
robust to modest changes in methodology; and, if the researcher
reports the result without accurately explaining how she arrived
at her methodology, she will likely give the reader a false
impression regarding the robustness of the study’s results.
This problem can, however, be addressed with
attentiveness to the scrutinize element of DASS. It is the
researcher’s responsibility to explain her methodology and to
perform and report basic robustness checks. She should also be
transparent regarding her use of pilot studies. The reader should
expect this. She should note whether the researcher has attested
to following DASS’s principles, and she should be diligent in
considering how the researcher has used pilot studies and why the
researcher has chosen a particular methodology. She should also
examine the study’s sensitivity analysis with respect to the study’s
major methodological features. For example, in the foregoing
illustration, a reader should expect the researcher to provide
sensitivity analysis displaying some of the results shown in Table
2. The reader’s attentiveness to the researcher’s attestation to her
adherence to DASS, use of pilot studies, and sensitivity analysis,
combined with the risk of overfitting, significantly limits the risk
of a researcher using a pilot study to mislead readers with respect
to the robustness of a study’s results.121

121 Importantly, in addition to the elements discussed, peer review and
“workshopping” can serve as fundamental safeguards against false impressions and data
fishing generally. When a researcher presents a finding to a particular research
community, members of that community—whether workshop participants or journal
referees—may insist on methodological specifications that differ from those employed by
the researcher, thereby implicitly or explicitly testing the robustness of the researcher’s
results. These community members, in general, do not have access to the data and have
neutral perspectives relative to that of the researcher, who may be subject to certain
conscious or subconscious motivational biases.
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Training Data

In the experimental setting, pilot studies allow the
researcher to benefit from exploration without compromising the
principles of DASS. In the observational setting, this function is
fulfilled by a process of partitioning a dataset into training data
and testing data, where the training data is used for exploratory
analysis and the testing data is used for confirmatory analysis.122
Once the data is validly partitioned, the discussion above
regarding data exploration using pilot studies generally applies
to data exploration using training data.123
A researcher can use training data to engage in
exploratory analysis legitimately, without data fishing, as
follows: First, without analyzing the outcome data (or, ideally,
without looking at it or even accessing it), the researcher should
obtain a small random sample from the dataset. Assume that a
dataset contains five-thousand data points. The researcher can
take a random sample of, e.g., 5% or 10% of the data (250 or 500
data points, respectively) and set it aside as a training dataset
while preserving the remaining data for the main study.124 The
researcher can then use the training data to perform exploratory
analysis. This data is analogous to the data in a pilot study. The
researcher can view the data, explore it, and test it for patterns.
As with a pilot study, the researcher can use her results from
the training data to inform her design for the main study—for
example, to inform the researcher’s modeling decisions, choice of
estimands and estimators, subgrouping decisions, and handling
of outliers.
This useful method, sometimes referred to as “train-test
splitting,” allows the researcher to conduct exploration on a
sample of data from the population of interest in the main study
while preserving the bulk of the data for testing in the main
study.125 Further, in certain circumstances, more complex “cross
validation” methods may allow a researcher to perform
exploratory analysis on a sample of the data without having to
then discard the training data during the testing phase in the
main study.126 These methods may be particularly useful when

122 The terms “training data” and “testing data” (or “test data”) are borrowed from
the machine-learning context, where, for example, a model is trained to recognize patterns
in data using training data before it is evaluated using test data. See Yarkoni & Westfall,
supra note 43, at 1102, 1111.
123 See supra Section III.A.
124 See Yarkoni & Westfall, supra note 43, at 1110–11.
125 See id.
126 See id.
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the entire dataset involves a relatively small sample and the
researcher cannot afford to discard any data.127
The researcher should be cautious to obtain training data in
a way that allows her to evidence her adherence to DASS. In the
experimental context, this is simple because the researcher
generally has control over when the data is generated and thus can
perform pilot studies and complete her design of the main study
prior to accessing any main-study data. Observational studies can
present additional challenges in this regard. However, establishing
good evidence of a researcher’s adherence to DASS is frequently
possible, even when the researcher begins her research by
performing exploratory analysis on training data. For example, a
researcher obtaining data from a third party may be able to request
that the data be transferred to the researcher in two phases—first,
a small random sample of the data would be transferred for use as
training data, followed by the remaining data to be transferred at a
later date for use as testing data.
In some circumstances, it can be very difficult to obtain
relevant data, and convincing the data provider to coordinate a
phased transfer of the data may be out of the question. In these
situations, however, the researcher can consider using a committee
to facilitate her use of training data for exploration. In particular,
the committee would receive the data and transfer training data to
the researcher while restricting access to the remaining data until a
later date. The committee would maintain a record and timeline of
all data released to the researcher.128
127 As Yarkoni & Westfall explain, in the context of selecting and testing the
performance of a model,

instead of assigning each observation exclusively to either the training or the
test datasets, one can do both, by repeating the cross-validation twice. In one
“fold” of the analysis, one half of the data is used for training and the other half
for testing; in a second fold, the datasets are reversed, and the training set and
test sets exchange roles. The overall model performance is then computed by
averaging the test performance scores of the two folds, resulting in a single
estimate that uses all of the data for both training and testing yet never uses
any single data point for both. More generally, this approached is termed Kfold cross-validation, where K, the number of “folds,” can be any number
between 2 and the number of observations in the full dataset (but is most
commonly set to a value in the range of 3 to 10).
Id. at 1111.
128 In certain circumstances, a data provider may be reluctant to transfer
potentially sensitive data to a committee rather than to the researcher directly. In these
circumstances, the researcher might consider assigning a member or members of her
research team to act as a third-party entity to restrict the primary researcher’s access to
the data and to transfer the data to the researcher in phases. This is of course less ideal
than having a neutral third-party entity to facilitate data transfer, but with proper
precautions (e.g., creating an informational screen between individuals who have access
to the test data and individuals who will perform exploratory analysis in the training
phase, carefully maintaining records, etc.), this procedure may allow a researcher to
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In still other circumstances, the researcher will not be
able to provide strong evidence that her exploration has not
violated DASS’s principles. These situations generally
correspond to those in which evidencing adherence to DASS is
difficult in the first instance, except through the researcher’s
attestation and scrutinization. In these situations, the
researcher should follow the same procedures recommended in
Section II.C, such as careful record keeping, attesting to the
researcher’s adherence to DASS in the study’s report, and
detailing the results of the researcher’s sensitivity analysis.
Now, however, the researcher should also account for the
exploration phase in her record keeping and attestation. The
researcher should be transparent. For example, she should
report her steps for partitioning the data into training data and
testing data, her timeline for accessing each component of the
data, and the steps she took to prevent data fishing, as well as
associated evidence and records.
The observational context frequently requires additional
care to ensure that the researcher can obtain training data
without compromising the dataset generally and that she can
substantiate her adherence to DASS, notwithstanding the study’s
exploration phase. However, the discussion regarding exploration
using pilot samples generally applies equally to exploration using
training data in the observational context. If the dataset is validly
partitioned, exploration in the training data will not cause false
positives in the main study using the testing data. Similarly, false
impressions can be managed, as in the experimental context,
using reasonable diligence and sensitivity analysis.
In summary, although the observational context
frequently requires additional care to ensure that the researcher
will obtain training data without compromising DASS’s
principles, the discussion above regarding exploration using pilot
samples generally applies equally to exploration using training
data in the observational context. DASS does not require
sacrificing the benefits of exploratory analysis, even in the
observational context. It only requires thoughtful planning and
principled use of the data. In a sense, DASS facilitates a balance
between the benefits of exploration using pilot studies and
training data on the one hand and the need to safeguard against
data fishing on the other.

establish convincing evidence of her adherence to DASS notwithstanding certain
challenges associated with completing a phased data transfer of sensitive data.
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ADDRESSING DATA FISHING IN THE COURTROOM

As discussed in Section I.E, data fishing is common and
more overt in litigation, notwithstanding protections against
unreliable evidence. In cases involving empirical evidence, data
fishing causes inaccuracy and facilitates disingenuous battles
over methodology. More generally, data fishing plays a
substantial role in causing the hired-gun problem and issues
associated with battling experts. At the very least, experts have
a substantial opportunity to engage in data fishing, and this
alone can have far-reaching consequences.129 Ultimately, data
fishing causes unpredictability, inaccuracy, and loss of faith in
experts and the judicial system, among other serious
problems.130 Eliminating the opportunity for experts to engage
in data fishing, while not a silver bullet, would go a long way
toward increasing the reliability of expert evidence.
An in-depth discussion of eliminating data fishing in
litigation or of solving the hired-gun problem is beyond the scope
of this article. Below, however, I briefly consider two
applications of the discussion above for addressing the problem
of data fishing in the courtroom.
First, trial courts should consider at least the basic
elements of DASS in determining the admissibility of statistical
evidence. Empirical results that are unreliable should be
excluded from evidence under Daubert and Rule 702. Statistical
results that are produced by data fishing are unreliable. They
are misleading and suffer from unreasonably high error rates—
error rates that are far higher than those asserted by the expert.
As such, they should be excluded as unreliable evidence.131
My intention is not to argue that courts should
necessarily exclude all analyses for which the researcher is
unable to establish strict adherence to the principles of DASS.
Rather, courts should view data fishing as a substantial threat
to reliability and should consider these principles when applying
See supra Section I.E.
One consequence of the hired-gun and battle-of-the-experts problems is that
juries can obtain a grossly lopsided image of the relevant scientific community’s position
on an issue. For example, even if 95% of experts in a field would agree with the defendant
and only 5% of experts would agree with the plaintiff, the jury may well not become
aware of this disparity from the testimony at trial. The jury would hear testimony from
the plaintiff ’ s and the defendant’s experts, and frequently would not have any
information as to the consensus in the field. See infra notes 136–139 and accompanying
text. Exacerbating this problem, the jury often lacks a clear understanding of the experts’
testimony and may decide which expert to believe based on criteria other than the
substance of their testimony—for example, an expert’s ability to convey information with
clarity or confidence.
131 See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text.
129
130
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standards of admissibility. Courts should at minimum consider
whether the expert has refrained from data fishing and made a
good faith effort not to mislead the jury. That is, courts should
confirm that the expert contemplated the study’s design prior to
beginning analysis and that the expert performed basic
sensitivity analysis. Ideally, experts will have established
evidence to substantiate their adherence to DASS, but, at
minimum, courts should consider requiring experts to attest to
following DASS’s principles at a basic level.
Additionally, lawmakers should consider revising
disclosure protections for nontestifying expert analysis to make
it more difficult for a litigant to introduce evidence that is based
on undisclosed exploratory analysis. Technically, exploration on
which a testifying expert’s analysis is based is discoverable. But
a litigant can bypass such discovery requirements, for example,
by employing a nontestifying expert to perform exploratory
analysis prior to hiring a testifying expert to perform
confirmatory analysis.132 Lawmakers should consider the
reliability implications of data fishing, as well as the elements of
DASS, in evaluating disclosure requirements and protections for
both testifying and nontestifying experts.133
Second, litigants and experts should consider adhering to
DASS’s principles in order to improve the credibility of an expert’s
testimony. In particular, a litigant whose expert adheres to DASS’s
See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
See generally Gelbach, supra note 79, at 134–35 (discussing disclosure
requirements for testifying and nontestifying experts); id. at 135–37 (discussing how “the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence work together to enable a well-prepared party
to punish an adversary for its expert’s use of data mining” but how a litigant can instead
achieve the same effect by “[h]iring [multiple] experts and directing each to conduct a single
test until one turns up a helpful result”); id. at 144–46 (suggesting that a “possible reform [to
prevent expert mining] would require disclosure not just of the number of experts hired, but
also of the contents of reports provided by a party’s nontestifying experts (including the
contents of any oral report)”); Posner, supra note 79, at 1541 (proposing that “lawyers who
call an expert witness could be required to disclose the name of all the experts whom they
approached as possible witnesses before settling on the one testifying” to “alert the jury to the
problem of ‘witness shopping’”). Gelbach is correct in emphasizing that, while “[v]arious
aspects of evidence and civil-procedure law disincentivize data mining,” “[n]othing in the
Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . prevents expert
mining.” Gelbach, supra note 79, at 131–32. But, while certain aspects of the rules of evidence
and procedure may discourage data fishing, they far from eliminate it; and, under certain
circumstances, data fishing can be accomplished more cheaply than expert mining. In any
event, the problem of data fishing via a nontestifying expert, like the problem of expert
mining, raises issues regarding disclosure loopholes that permit litigants to engage in
undisclosed exploration and selective reporting. It is possible that revising disclosure
protections would address individual-level data fishing and expert mining simultaneously.
However, applying DASS to expert testimony in the absence of revisions to the current
disclosure protections leaves open the possibility of expert mining or individual-level data
fishing via a nontestifying expert. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text; Gelbach,
supra note 79, at 144–46.
132
133
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principles can later present evidence of such adherence, or at least
have their expert attest to it, in order to increase the credibility of
the litigant’s empirical evidence. Litigants should also consider the
elements of DASS when cross examining an opposing party’s
experts and attempting to discredit their testimony.
Again, disclosure protections for nontestifying expert
analysis may interfere with the objectives of DASS in the litigation
setting. Disclosure rules may prevent cross examination regarding
a nontestifying expert’s analysis and may have implications for
privilege and waiver of privilege if a litigant introduces evidence
regarding a nontestifying expert’s adherence to DASS. But, at
minimum, experts can indicate their adherence to DASS in their
own analysis and litigants can cross examine a testifying expert
regarding whether she has engaged in data fishing or has relied on
a nontestifying expert’s exploratory analysis.134 Additionally, as
suggested above, lawmakers should reevaluate disclosure rules in
light of these considerations.
In deciding whether to adhere to DASS, a litigant may have
the concern that not engaging in data fishing would be too risky.
After all, data fishing allows an expert to search for and select the
methodology that most favors the sponsoring litigant. But, this
reasoning does not hold water. Although DASS insists on
developing one’s methodology blindly—that is, without accessing
the study’s outcome data—the litigant maintains control of her
case, and particularly, the material that she chooses to offer as
evidence. Although following DASS requires commitment to one’s
methodology prior to analyzing the data, the litigant does not
commit to offering the results of their expert’s analysis prior to
reviewing them. Instead, the litigant would review their results
and then decide whether to offer them as evidence. The litigant
could likely even avoid having to disclose their unsuccessful
attempts to follow DASS by employing a nontestifying expert or
multiple experts generally.135
134 In certain contexts, it may be appropriate for a court to apply a procedure, based
on the principles of DASS, in which parties litigate to arrive at a suitable methodology that
would then be applied by all parties to a specific dataset.
135 If the sponsoring litigant attempts to adhere to DASS via nontestifying
expert analysis, it may be protected from disclosure. See supra notes 89–91 and
accompanying text. If, however, the litigant uses a testifying expert and the failed
attempt is discoverable, the party opposing the evidence can highlight for the jury that
the sponsor of the evidence sought to prove their argument legitimately and only decided
to resort to data fishing once realizing that the legitimate approach yields unfavorable
results. Even so, however, a litigant may (unfortunately) be able to avoid disclosure of
their failed attempt to adhere to DASS by hiring a new expert. See supra notes 132–133
and accompanying text; Gelbach, supra note 79, at 135–37. In any event, an expert may
be able to employ legitimate data-exploration methods, discussed supra Part III, while
remaining consistent with DASS’s principles.
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Furthermore, expert evidence that relies on data fishing or
that fails to involve safeguards against it signals to the jury that
the evidence is not trustworthy. In particular, if a litigant resorts
to data fishing or cannot establish that steps have been taken to
safeguard against it, the opposing litigant can and should seek to
discredit the expert’s claims as unreliable, regardless of whether
the litigant has abandoned an earlier attempt to adhere to DASS
or has simply never made any such attempt.
Thus, both parties have a strong incentive to adhere to
DASS: if one party does and the other does not, the jury may credit
only the evidence sponsored by the adhering party. This effect is
similar to that described in Robertson’s analysis in Blind Expertise,
in which Robertson proposes that parties hire experts
anonymously through intermediaries so that the experts are
unaware of which party hired them and are therefore incentivized
to provide unbiased opinions.136 As is the case here, once a party
learns of the opinion of their expert, they can then decide whether
to introduce it as evidence.137 As Robertson explains, a litigant’s
choice to introduce or exclude the evidence after learning of the
expert’s opinion only improves reliability:
When both litigants in a case try the procedure, two experts will
independently render opinions on the same case, and the procedure
sends a signal to factfinders only when the two blind experts agree
and one litigant discloses his favorable expert to the jury. An
erroneous signal from a blind expert is thus exponentially less likely
than from a single court-appointed expert. If, on the other hand, the
two blind experts disagree, the jury will see neither or both of them
and will thus be left in the same situation as the status quo.138

Similar to Robertson’s proposal, whether or not an expert adheres
to DASS should be an important factor in a jury’s determination as
to whether to credit the expert’s claims; therefore, reliability is
improved even when a party is permitted to attempt adherence to
DASS and exclude their analysis, without having to disclose their
failed attempt, after learning the results.
This method is of course distinct from Robertson’s
procedure of blinding experts. It is not a procedure for generally
“eliminat[ing] . . . litigant-induced selection, compensation, and
affiliation biases.”139 Rather, it simply aims to improve the state of
expert testimony by preventing litigation parties from introducing
evidence that involves invalid statistical methodology—although

136
137
138
139

Robertson, supra note 4, at 179–80, 201–19.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179.
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such methodology may arise, in part, from an expert’s biases. It
does this by providing a concrete standard, DASS, by which courts,
litigation parties, and juries can judge whether an expert has taken
steps to safeguard against data fishing.
Importantly, in addition to facilitating more reliable expert
testimony, DASS has important implications for litigants’
substantive arguments. As courts and juries become more
conscious of the dangers of data fishing, litigants will become more
prone to adhering to DASS, since they know that not doing so will
result in the court excluding or the jury discrediting their evidence.
In turn, as litigants feel more pressure to adhere to DASS, this
pressure may well impact their substantive arguments. In
particular, litigants may adopt more extreme positions when they
know that they can support those positions through data fishing.
Extremeness may, for various reasons, help a litigant to achieve
their litigation goals. But, if a litigant feels pressure to adhere to
DASS, then a tradeoff may arise between the extremeness of a
litigant’s position and their ability to support that position with
data. For example, a prespecified methodology may be less likely
to yield a statistically significant result in support of an extreme
position relative to a more moderate position. This effect may lead
to more moderate and more genuine litigation positions. It may
also lead to more settlements, as parties realize that their abilities
to support extreme positions are limited.
In short, empirical results produced by data fishing in
litigation, like those in scholarship, are unreliable, leading to a
wide range of harmful effects. Courts should consider DASS’s
principles in assessing reliability, and, in certain circumstances,
should exclude expert evidence that fails to adhere to them.
Additionally, litigants and experts should adhere to these
principles in developing evidence and should discredit evidence
developed by an opposing party that has not adhered to them.
CONCLUSION: WHAT IT MEANS TO ADHERE TO DASS
Data fishing invalidates statistical results by causing false
positives and false impressions, and it creates an environment in
which, at best, readers are highly skeptical of statistical claims
and, at worst, readers base important decisions, such as policy
decisions and jury verdicts, on incorrect information.
DASS is intended to serve as a framework and standard
for safeguarding against data fishing. It is for both researchers
and readers: researchers should follow it in their research and
readers should expect adherence to it and should use it to
evaluate a researcher’s claims. It builds on established
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statistical methods to form a framework that is concrete but
sufficiently flexible to accommodate a very wide variety of
research settings and conditions. Its focus is not only on taking
steps to safeguard against data fishing; rather, it is also
concerned with establishing evidence that such steps have been
taken—that is, with substantiating a researcher’s anti-datafishing practices. This is crucial to incentivizing researchers to
follow such practices, to allowing readers to evaluate statistical
studies appropriately, and to reversing the norm of data fishing
and replacing it with one of transparency and reliability, and one
by which researchers are expected to persuade readers of a
study’s safeguards against data fishing—just as researchers do
for other components of a study.
As such, an important component of DASS, and the
substantiate element in particular, is for the researcher to attest
to her adherence to DASS’s principles. Let us consider what it
means for a researcher to state that she has adhered to DASS.
First, note that many types of statistical analysis do not
call for a researcher to follow the principles of DASS. Also, data
fishing should not be confused with exploratory analysis.
Exploration is important. Indeed, it is a fundamental component
of scientific development.140 A researcher engaged in data
fishing, on the other hand, hides the exploratory context from
the reader and reports statistical results misleadingly as though
they arose from confirmatory analysis. It is perfectly valid to
conduct exploratory analysis. Many studies are entirely
exploratory in nature. Others include both confirmatory and
exploratory components—sometimes described as a study’s
“primary” and “secondary” analyses.
The key is for a researcher to be transparent regarding
the nature of the research. Additionally, it is important for the
researcher and the reader to understand that exploratory
analysis will produce a particularly high level of false positives
and should not be treated as confirmatory analysis. Researchers
should refrain from discussing exploratory results as though
they are conclusive findings of statistical patterns; and readers
should not understand them as such. Exploratory analysis is
better used to corroborate confirmatory results, to add color to
results of primary analyses, and to discover potential patterns
to be examined further in separate studies.

140 As noted in the NASEM Report, “some of the most important discoveries in
the annals of science have come from unexpected results that did not fit any prior
theory.” NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 96.
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Second, perfection is not necessary for a researcher to
state that she has adhered to DASS. DASS signals that the
researcher has followed a set of principles. If a researcher has
not followed these principles but has not engaged in data fishing,
the researcher should at least attest to not having engaged in
data fishing. Every empirical paper that is reported as
confirmatory in nature—e.g., making use of hypothesis tests—
should include at least this much.
The problem with attesting only to not having engaged in
data fishing is that it is ambiguous. For example, if such a
statement is included in a study’s report, should we assume that
the researcher completed, or at least contemplated, her design
prior to analyzing the data? Perhaps she began her analysis
without prespecifying her design, scanned over the data
informally, and then performed three or four hypothesis tests and
reported the test that she decided involved the best methodology—
although only after observing the tests’ results. A well-meaning
researcher could easily take these steps and innocently attest to
not having engaged in data fishing. But these steps are exactly
that. A well-meaning researcher may have an idea of data fishing
that entails an image of a devilish character sitting in front of a
computer examining thousands of methodologies to see which
produces the most favorable results; as such, and perhaps with
minimal training regarding the actual meaning and risks of data
fishing, she may report, without any burden on the conscience, that
she has not engaged in any such practice.
Attesting to DASS, on the other hand, indicates that the
researcher has followed a particular set of principles. It is
flexible and therefore applicable to a wide range of research
settings, conditions, and researcher styles. Some researchers
will follow it more meticulously than others. But, at its core,
following DASS means that the researcher (1) contemplated and
specified the study’s design before engaging in analysis, and
analyzed the data consistently with that design; (2) thought
carefully about whether the researcher has been upfront
regarding the study’s methodology and results and took steps to
avoid misleading the reader with respect to the robustness of the
study’s results; and (3) is willing to take and has taken steps to
substantiate the study’s safeguards against data fishing—at
least by attesting to them.
These elements constitute the minimal standard for
adherence to DASS’s principles. Researchers should go beyond
this standard. They should prespecify and record their study
designs, they should perform thorough sensitivity analyses, and
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they should take care to establish and maintain evidence of
these steps—for example, a timeline and record of when the
researcher completed a study’s protocol and when the researcher
gained access to the study’s data. Researchers should discuss
these steps in their reports. They should get credit for it: it
strengthens their results and increases the credibility of their
claims. And readers should certainly examine these details
when evaluating a study and deciding whether and to what
degree to credit a researcher’s claims. But, adhering to DASS
means, at minimum, following the principles above.
Importantly, in passive terms, the principles of DASS
essentially state: do not data fish and do not mislead the reader.
But DASS requires going beyond passively not data fishing and
not misleading the reader. It involves proactive steps for
safeguarding against data fishing.
No study is perfect. All studies will have flaws with respect
to methodology and to safeguarding against data fishing. But,
while there are many factors that can invalidate a statistical study,
perhaps none is so widespread, so damaging, and so capable of
being addressed as the problem of data fishing. To be sure, solving
the big-picture problem requires completely reversing a relatively
strong norm. But at the level of the particular case or the particular
paper, there are concrete proactive steps that a researcher can and
should take to safeguard against data fishing. And readers—
whether scholars, courts, juries, or other consumers of empirical
research—should expect and tolerate no less than a researcher’s
performance of these steps. This is the idea behind DASS.

